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The purpose of this thesis is to review and synopsize
the major new issues currently affecting Government
acquisition. The individual topics discussed are: (1) the
Federal acquisition process, (2) the Packard Commission's
recommendations and their effect on Government acquisition,
(3) the role of competition in Government contracting, (4)
the new requirements for weapon systems warranties, (5) the
role source selection plays in the acquisition process, (6)
how delays in contractor performance affect the Government,
(7) the role of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) in Government acquisition, (8) the recent changes in
the Weighted Guidelines (WGLs) for profit, (9) the impact of
the Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) Study on
investment, progress payments and profit, and (10) the role
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) plays in major weapon
systems acquisitions. This thesis will serve to update the
Manual of Acquisition Topics, a single desk reference guide
for acquisition managers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Acquisition in the Federal Government is an extremely
complex field comprised of many rapidly changing areas.
Defense acquisition alone is the largest business in the
world with annual purchases approaching $170 billion. The
Department of Defense (DoD) processes nearly 15 million
contract actions a year, which averages 56,000 contract
actions every working day. These figures, compiled by the
Packard Commission, are staggering considering the
multitude of rules, regulations and pieces of legislation
which must be complied with in order to do the job.
The purpose of this thesis is to synopsize the major
issues currently impacting the field of Government
acquisition. In addition to addressing current issues, this
thesis will be used to update the Manual of Acquisition
Topics , which serves as a single desk reference guide for
acquisition managers and is maintained by the Naval
Postgraduate School.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With the basic objective in mind, the primary research
question is: What are the major issues currently affecting
Government acquisition?
Secondary research questions are:
1. What is a current description of the Government
acquisition process?
2. What effect has the Packard Commission Report had on
Government acquisition?
3. How has the role of competition in Government con-
tracting changed?
4. What new requirements exist for weapon systems
warranties?
5. How does source selection affect the acquisition
process?
6. What impacts do delays in performance by contractors
under Government contracts, have on the customers?
7. What role does the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) have in defining the field of
Government acquisition?
8. What are the recent changes in the profit policy
weighted guidelines?
9. What impact, with respect to investment, progress
payments and profit, has the Defense Financial and
Investment Review (DFAIR) Study had on Government
acquisition?
10. What role does Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
play in Government acquisition of major systems?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The majority of the research for this thesis was done
through a comprehensive search of the literature utilizing
the Naval Postgraduate School Library, the Department of
Administrative Sciences Library, Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE), and the National Contract
Management Association (NCMA). Telephonic and personal
interviews of leading contracting practitioners were also
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utilizied. Current Department of Defense (DoD) directives,
instructions, regulations and policy guidance were reviewed.
Current information on each topic area was assimilated and
synopsized to provide the acquisition practitioner with an
up-to-date working knowledge in each of the ten areas being
studied.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The main thrust of this thesis is to discuss the major
issues currently affecting Government acquisition. These
issues are:
1. The Acquisition Process
2. The Packard Commission Report
3. Competition in Acquisition
4. Weapon Systems Warranties
5. Source Selection
6. Delays
7. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
8. Weighted Guidelines for Profit
9. The Defense Financial and Investment Review
(DFAIR) Study
10. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
The purpose of the thesis is to research and prepare an
evaluation of each of the ten topic areas above for
inclusion as an update to the Manual of Acquisition Topics .
The updated manual will provide contracting practitioners
with a working knowledge of the major issues currently
impacting the field of Government acquisition.
11
To facilitate the use of the updated manual, the
researcher strove to condense each new topic to a maximum of
four pages, whenever possible. The user will then be able
to develop a working knowledge of each topic area and refer
to each section's references and bibliography for further
study, if required. The thesis has an introduction, a
conclusion and four additional chapters, which coincide with
the chapter headings used in the Manual of Acquisition
Topics , under which the ten topics discussed in the thesis
fall. These four chapter headings are:
a) Contracting and General Acquisition Subjects
b) Legal Subjects
c) Finance, Economics and Accounting Subjects
d) Logistics Management Subjects
The chapter entitled "Production Subjects," which is
found in the Manual of Acquisition Topics , is not included
in the thesis because none of the ten current issues being
studied happen to fall under the "Production Subjects"
category. The final chapter includes conclusions and
recommendations for each topic.
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY
Due to the nature of the thesis, only broad topics in
each area are discussed. A comprehensive discussion of each
subject would be too voluminous for inclusion in the Manual
of Acquisition Topics and would be beyond the scope of this
12
study. The author assumes the reader is somewhat familiar
with basic acquisition terminology, but does not have in
depth knowledge in any of the topic areas.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis provides the reader with a synopsis of ten
major issues currently affecting Government acquisition.
This chapter discusses the researcher's objectives and the
purpose of the thesis. Since this thesis will be used to
update the Manual of Acquisition Topics , chapter headings
coincide with those in the manual.
Chapter II discusses the contracting and general
acquisition subjects of the acquisition process, the Packard
Commission Report, competition in acquisition, weapon
systems warranties and source selection.
Chapter III deals with the legal topics of delays and
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).
Chapter IV addresses the finance, economics and
accounting subjects of the weighted guidelines for profit
and the Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
Study.
Chapter V discusses the logistics management topic of
integrated logistics support (ILS).
Chapter VI presents the author's observations,
conclusions and recommendations on each of the ten issues
currently affecting Government acquisition.
13
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY
The goal of this thesis is to help the practitioner in
the field of Government contracting to understand the new
issues which are currently impacting the profession. By
identifying and discussing these issues, the practitioner
will have a greater understanding of their impact. This
thesis will serve to update the Manual of Acquisition Topics
which is maintained by the Naval Postgraduate School and
provided to acquisition professionals throughout the Federal
Government.
14
II. CONTRACTING AND GENERAL ACQUISITION SUBJECTS
A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Characteristics and Analysis of the acquisition
process must begin with a current definition of the process
as it exists today. Federal procurement has been evolving
virtually since the founding of this great nation. The
current acquisition process has been shaped by the Congress,
the courts, Government officials, military officers,
lawyers, industry executives and the general public.
Federal acquisition professionals are publicly accountable
for their actions, and they must acquire quality goods and
services, in a timely fashion, while maximizing competition
and obtaining the most reasonable prices. Those engaged in
the Government acquisition process are constantly confronted
with a series of laws, regulations, procedures and legal
precedents
.
The sheer magnitude, diversity and complexity of
Government contracting make an analysis of the acquisition
process difficult. The acquisition process steps which
apply to the smallest purchases must also apply to the
purchase of major weapon systems. The phases of the major
systems acquisition cycle are much longer and more
complicated, but the acquisition process model is
conceptually the same. Any analysis of the Federal
15
acquisition process is important and ongoing because the
process is constantly changing and evolving as new
regulations are written and new legislation is passed. Even
as this analysis is being written, the first Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)), Mr. Richard Godwin, is
proposing new major systems acquisition milestones. The
Federal acquisition process is highly dynamic, ever-changing
and continues to unfold on a daily basis.
The Federal acquisition process is a mechanism for
ensuring that decisions are made by a Government official at
the lowest level of authority possessing a total view of the
program, and at the proper timeframe in the procurement of
goods and services for the Federal Government. In the
acquisition of major weapon systems, decision points are
strategically placed at critical steps, called major
milestones, in the process. These critical milestone
decisions in most programs are made by the Secretary of
Defense who decides the program's fate. The critical
decision points in any acquisition coincide with the major
steps in the acquisition process such as: acquisition
planning, sourcing, contract agreement and contract
performance. The acquisition process attempts to ensure
that these decisions are made by the appropriate people at
the correct point in time. The Federal acquisition process
is an effective management system of checks and balances,






The acquisition process is the method the Federal
Government uses to obtain needed supplies and services to
perform its varied missions. It virtually encompasses all
phases and functions related to the acquisition and it
begins at the point when the activity's needs are
established and continues through delivery and contract
completion. Congressional statutes, executive orders and
regulations provide the basic framework, governing the
Federal acquisition process. Although the process varies
slightly from agency to agency and procurement to
procurement due to the different procurement sizes and
magnitudes, the basic acquisition process is outlined in the
next section.
2 Steps in the Acquisition Process
a. Requirements Determination
- Needs/requirements are identified and an
appropriately funded purchase request is
generated.
b. Procurement Planning










- nature of work.
- current market conditions
c. Solicitation
(1) In sealed bid - an invitation for bid (IFB)
is prepared and issued.
(2) In competitive proposals (negotiated
procurement) - a request for proposals (RFP)
is prepared and issued.
d. Source Selection
(1) In sealed bid - bids are opened in public
and responses are recorded and reviewed for
mistakes. The lowest responsive and respon-
sible bidder is determined.
(2) In competitive proposals (negotiated
procurement) - proposals are reviewed to
select those offerors who are in the com-
petitive range. Negotiate with all selected
offerors as to the work, price, terms and
conditions, contract type, etc.
e. Award
(1) In sealed bid - award to the lowest respon-
sive and responsible bidder.
(2) In competitve proposals (negotiated
procurement) - award to the offeror pro-
posing the most advantageous offer to the
Government when price and other factors are
considered.
f. Contract Administration
- involves all actions necessary to assure com-
pliance with the terms and conditions of the




(4) Receipt and inspection
18
3 . The Model of the Acquisition Process
In 1972, the Commission on Government Procurement
(COGP) published a model of the procurement process. Since
then the COGP model has been widely recognized as the most
representative model of the Federal procurement process.
This model is displayed in Figure 2-1. [Ref. l:p. 218]
> *'-- v
-U- -•-»***"
aThe Commission on Government Procurement published
this model in its report in 1972. It has been widely
accepted as representative of the federal procurement
process. With approval of the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 the terminology used by the commission to
represent the two principal methods of procurement could
be changed to read sealed bidding and competitive pro-
posals. Regardless, the model is an accurate repesenta-
tion of the system.
Source: Government Procurement Management by
Stanley N. Sherman
Figure 2-1: The Procurement Process
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4. Major Weapon Systems Acquisition
In the procurement of major weapon systems, the
acquisition process is much longer and more complicated than
the model presented in the last section. In 1976, the
Office of Procurement Policy (OFPP) developed the model for
major systems acquisition in compliance with the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109, "Major System
Acquisitions." To implement A-109, DoD issued DoD Directive
5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions," and DoD Instruction
5000.2, "Major System Acquisition Procedures." The OFPP
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Source: Gover nment Procurement Management by
Stanley N. Sherman
Figure 2-2: Major Systems Acquisition Cycle
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The A-109 model has numbered decision points after
each step in the major systems acquisition cycle starting
after the requirements determination step. DoD refers to
these various decision points as milestones and are shown in


























Source: Navy Program Manager's Guide
Figure 2-3: Acquisition Phases and Milestones
a. Phases and Milestones of the Major Systems
Acquisition Cycle
(1) Requirements Determination Phase . During
this phase a mission area analysis (MAA) is conducted in
response to a new threat, projected obsolescence of existing
systems, new technology or an opportunity for cost
21
reduction. If a new program is warranted, a Justification
for Major System New Start (JMSNS) must be submitted. At
the conclusion of the requirements determination phase, DoD
Milestone 0, which is the same as A-109 decision point #1,
occurs. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issues a Program
Decision Memorandum (PDM) (or a Secretary of Defense
Decision Memorandum (SDDM) in the case of a joint program).
If SECDEF approves, then the program can proceed. [Ref.
2:p. 1-121.
(2) Concept Exploration Phase . During this
phase the program is actually initiated and a program
manager (PM) is assigned. The PM solicits and evaluates
alternative concepts which will fulfill or exceed the
requirements of the mission need statement. The PM
documents the results of the concept exploration phase in a
system concept paper (SCP) and publishes them in a milestone
review document (MRD). At the conclusion of the concept
exploration phase, DoD Milestone I, which is the same as A-
109 decision point #2, occurs. Again, the SECDEF publishes
his/her decision in a SDDM, and if the program is given the
go ahead it can proceed to the next phase. [Ref. 2:p. 1-14]
(3) Demonstration and Validation Phase . The
demonstration and validation phase (DEM/VAL), involves
demonstration of the systems or critical subsystems to
verify performance and to see if a concept fulfills the
mission need. In this phase, advanced developmental models
22
(ADM's) and functional breadboards are fabricated to perform
operational testing. The results of this phase will be
documented in a MRD. At the end of DEM/VAL, DoD Milestone
II, which is equivalent to A-109 decision point #3, occurs.
The SECDEF publishes his/her decision in a SDDM. [Ref.
2:pp. 1-14,1-15]
(4) Full-Scale Development (FSD) Phase . During
FSD, a fully tested, documented and production engineered
design of the concept selected during DEM/VAL is developed.
It must be cost-effective, operationally feasible and able
to be produced. The final product of FSD is the baseline
configuration design and accompanying documentation. FSD
has three subphases which are: (1) the engineering
subphase, (2) the prototype subphase, and (3) the pilot-
production/transition to production phase. The results of
FSD are documented by the PM in a MRD. At the end of FSD,
DoD Milestone III, which is equivalent to A-109 decision
point #4, occurs. Usually the SECDEF delegates this
decision to the appropriate Service Secretary. Milestone
III can be split into two parts, with IIIA being the
decision for initial production and IIIB for full-scale
production. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-15, 1-16]
(5) Production and Deployment Phase . During
this phase the developing activity procures the major weapon
system and introduces it to the Fleet. Follow-on
operational testing still takes place to provide feedback to
23
the producer for product improvement. In large volume
programs there will usually be initial production with the
developing contractor and second-sourcing with another
producer. [Ref. 2:p. 1-16]
b. Proposed New Acquisition Milestones
Mr. Richard Godwin, the first Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)), has proposed a change in
the milestone process. The new acquisition system
milestones are:
(1) Milestone (New Start)
(2) Milestone I (Demonstration)
(3) Milestone II (Full Scale Development)
(4) Milestone III (Full Rate Production)
(5) Milestone IV (Readiness and Support Phase)
(6) Milestone V (Operational Phase)
These changes will bring more accountability to
the program manager in the later years to ensure the weapon
system is properly performing and fulfilling the need for
which it was designed. See Figure 2-4. [Ref. 3]
5 . References
1. Sherman, Stanley N., Government Procurement Management ,
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1985 Edition.
3. Godwin, Richard P., Testimony before the Research and
Development Subcommittee, House Armed Services
Committee, House of Representatives, First Session,
100th Congress, 4 March 1987.
24
MILESTONE (New Start)
• MISSION * RE QUIREMENI CONFIRMATION
• SCIfJUl I 1IIIH.I I 5 AIIOROA BH I If ANALYSIS
• TECHNICALS I AIDS 01 1IRMINA HON
• BASEUNt P| AN
• Al Ql MSI HON SI MAI I GV
• MISSION Nt f V S'AH MINI
• IPAl BKOMMI NDAHUNS IOSECDII
• Iiai pnfrARis PROG DECISION MIMO
• i<ir iiiniicnMi'ONiNi ACOtxrc
MILESTONE I ( Demonslralion)
• nlMO'VAl ItlAIION SIA1US
• TPAiiroirs/rPtHO' vr( anaiysis
• system coni i it awbovai
• ACQUtSmONSTRATEGY
• COAIS OB)E.CIWI STB a 1 EG Y APPROVAl
• BASIUNf PLAN ACCIRIANCI
• fA E PRI TABES SEC r>(l DEC MEMO
• l«K IMRUCOMPONSNI ACOEXIC
MILESTONE II (Full Scale Development)
• 01 VtlOfMCNT STATUS
• PROGHAM/DI V RASEUNI riAN
• ACQUISITION SIBAIf GY
• OPERAIIONAI TESTING
•RASE I INI PI AN ACCI PIANCE
• DECISION COOBO'NAUNG PAPER
• DAI PBI PARIS SI (01 I DEC MIMO
• EXEC IIIRUEOMPONENI ACQ I HC
MILESTONE III (Pull Rate Production)
• III'DAIIO PROGRAM RASIIINE
• PBOOUCHON IASIUNE
• (PPDATl D Dl C ISION COOR RAPE R
• I OVA* RAM INIIIAI PRODUC IIONRPI
• UAl PRE PAR | S SE I 01 ' DM MIMO
• I XI C IMRIJCOMPONI Nl Ad) Ell (
MILESTON E IV ( Readiness & Support Phase)
• POSI IOC I tSARSoSMRISWl IS
• S't'lMUlf CYCIE ANAIYSIS
• I IPO A II D DECISION (OOR P»P|R
• OAf OICISlON ANU RECOMMI NOATION
MILESTONE V (Operational Phase
• post ioc ; s Y(ARSflssuus(ri.ANS vs re suns)
• IIPC.RAOI ( R[ I IRE INI W SIARI
• OAE 01 I ISION ANOBKOMMENDAIION
Source: Mr. Richard P. Godwin's Testimony before the
Research and Development Subcommittee, House
Armed Services Committee
Figure 2-4: Acquisition System Milestones
6 . Bibliography for Further Study
DoD Directive 5000.1, Major System Acquisitions , 12 March
1986.
DoD Instruction 5000.2, Major System Acquisition Procedures.
12 March 1986.
Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-109, "Major
System Acquisition," 5 April 1976.
25
B. THE PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT
The Characteristics of the Packard Commission Report and
an Analysis of the report would include the reason for the
study, principal parts of the study, and its findings,
conclusions and recommendations.
The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, headed by Mr. David Packard, was formed in July
1985 to study the issues facing defense management and
report its findings and recommendations to the President.
Initial recommendations were presented in the Commission's
Interim Report issued on February 28, 1986. This report
outlined ways to improve defense management in the following
four major areas which were studied: (1) national security
planning and budgeting, (2) military organization and
command, (3) acquisition organization and procedures, and
(4) government-industry accountability. In June 1986, the
Packard Commission issued its final report entitled "A Quest
for Excellence," a goal toward which all persons in defense
management should strive. [Ref. l:p. xil
This analysis will concentrate on those findings and
recommendations made by the Commission's Acquisition Task
Force. The Packard Commission was established partly
because public confidence in the effectiveness of the
defense acquisition system was shaken by "horror stories" of
overpriced spare parts, cost and schedule overruns, and
testing failures of major weapon systems. This analysis
26
will focus on Chapter Three of the report entitled:
"Acquisition Organization and Procedures." Chapter Three
provides a detailed look, at defense acquisition and how it
can be improved. The task force divided it research into
five sections: (1) Introduction, (2) The Scope of the
Defense Acquisition System, (3) Problems With the Present
Acquisition System, (4) An Acquisition Model to Emulate, and
(5) A Formula for Action. In general, the task force
concentrated on finding a model of excellence for the
defense acquisition system to emulate and upon which reforms
could be based. The task force found that most of the
problems in defense acquisition were not caused by
dishonesty or fraud. These problems were rather symptoms of
greater problems affecting the entire acquisition system.
They observed that the laws Congress was passing to correct
the problems were instead aggravating the situation by
making acquisition procedures more inflexible. [Ref. 2:p.
A-3]
In analyzing highly successful acquisition programs in
the commercial world as well as in Government, the task
force identified six characteristics which were common to
each program. These were: (1) clear command channels, (2)
stability, (3) limited reporting requirements, (4) small,
high quality staffs, (5) communication with users, and (6)
prototyping and testing. [Ref. l:p. 50] From studying
these program characteristics, the task force developed nine
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broad recommendations for changing the defense acquisition
system. They are: (1) streamline acquisition organization
and procedures, (2) use technology to reduce cost, (3)
balance cost and performance, (4) stabilize programs, (5)
expand the use of commercial products, (6) increase the use
of competition, (7) clarify the need for technical data
rights, (8) enhance the quality of acquisition personnel,
and (9) improve the capability for industrial mobilization.
Each of these recommendations is expanded upon in the next
section. [Ref. l:pp. 52-71]
1 . Discussion
The Packard Commission was charged with evaluating
the defense acquisition system and recommending ways to
improve the system. To accomplish this task, the Commission
formed an Acquisition Task Force. Instead of just analyzing
the "horror stories," as others had done, the task force
compared the defense acquisition process with successful
systems in both the private and public sectors. In doing
the comparison, the task force developed a model of
excellence for the DoD acquisition system to emulate. The
Packard Commission stressed that more Congressional
legislation was not the answer to the problems facing
defense acquisition, but rather a hindrance to the process.
Instead of concentrating on spare parts procurement, the
task force focused on the more expensive problems of cost
overruns and long acquisition cycles in the procurement of
major weapon systems. In addition to modeling defense
28
acquisition after the practices of the best companies in
industry, the Packard Commission made nine recommendations
for improving the defense acquisition system. These
recommendations are entitled "A Formula for Action.
"
2 . A Formula for Action
a. Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures
(1) We strongly recommend creation by statute of
the new position of Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) and authorization of an addi-
tional Level II appointment in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). [Ref. l:p. 53]
(2) The Army, Navy, and Air Force should each
establish a comparable senior position filled by
a top-level civilian Presidential appointee.
[Ref. l:p. 54]
(3) Each Service Acquisition Executive should
appoint a number of Program Executive Officers.
[Ref. 1: p. 54]
(4) Federal laws governing procurement should be
recodified into a single, greatly simplified
statute applicable government-wide. [Ref. 1:
p. 54]
(5) DoD should substantially reduce the number of
acquisition personnel. [Ref. l:p. 55]
b. Use Technology to Reduce Cost
We recommend a high priority on building and testing
prototype systems to demonstrate that new technology
can substantially improve military capability, and
to provide a basis for realistic cost estimates prior
to a full-scale development decision. Operational
testing should begin early in advanced development,
using prototype hardware. The early phase of R & D
should employ extensive informal competition and use
streamlined procurement processes. To promote
innovation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency should engage in prototyping and other
advanced development work on joint programs and in
areas not adequately emphasized by the Services.
[Ref. l:p. 55]
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c. Balance Cost and Performance
A restructured Joint Requirements and Management
Board (JRMB), cochaired by the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) and the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, should play an active and
important role in all joint programs and in all major
Service programs. The JRMB should define weapon
requirements for development, and provide thereby
an early trade-off between cost and performance.
[Ref. l:p. 57]
d. Stabilize Programs
Program stability must be enhanced in two funda-
mental ways. First, DoD should fully institution-
alize "baselining" for major weapon systems at the
initiation of full-scale engineering development.
Second, DoD and Congress should expand the use of
multi-year procurement for high-priority systems.
[Ref. l:p. 59]
e. Expand the Use of Commercial Products
Rather than relying on excessively rigid military
specifications, DoD should make greater use of
components, systems, and services available "off-
the-shelf." It should develop new or custom-made
items only when it has been established that those
readily available are clearly inadequate to meet
military requirements. [Ref. l:p. 60]
f. Increase the Use of Competition
Federal law and DoD regulations should provide for
substantially increased use of commercial-style
competition, emphasizing quality and established
performance as well as price. [Ref. l:p. 62]
g. Clarify the Need for Technical Data Rights
DoD must recognize the delicate and necessary balance
between the government's requirement for technical
data and the benefit to the nation that comes from
protecting the private sector's proprietary rights.
That balance must be struck so as to foster tech-
nological innovation and private investment which
is so important in developing products vital to
our defense. DoD should adopt a technical data
rights policy that reflects the following principles:
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(1) If a product has been developed with private
funds, the government should not demand, as a
precondition for buying that product, unlimited
data rights.
(2) If a product is to be developed with mixed
private and government funding, the
government's rights to the data should be
defined during contract negotiations.
(3) If a product is developed entirely with
government funds, the government normally
acquires all the rights in the resulting
data. [Ref. l:p. 64]
h. Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel
DoD must be able to attract and retain the caliber of
people necessary for a quality acquisition program.
Significant improvements should be made in the
senior-level appointment system. The Secretary of
Defense should have increased authority to establish
flexible personnel management policies necessary to
improve defense acquisition. An alternate personnel
management system should be established to include
senior acquisition personnel and contracting officers
as well as scientists and engineers. Federal regu-
lations should establish business-related education
and experience criteria for civilian contracting
personnel, which will provide a basis for the pro-
fessionalization of their career paths. Federal
law should permit expanded opportunities for the
education and training of all civilian acquisition
personnel. [Ref. l:pp. 65-66]
i. Improve the Capability for Industrial Mobilization
We recommend that the President, through the National
Security Council, establish a comprehensive and
effective national industrial responsiveness policy
to support the full spectrum of potential emergen-
cies. The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, should respond with a general
statement of surge mobilization requirements for
basic wartime defense industries, and logistic needs
to support those industries and the essential
economy. The DoD and Service Acquisition Executives
should consider this mobilization guidance in for-
mulating their acquisition policy, and program
managers should incorporate industrial surge and




President Reagan directed DoD to implement virtually
all of the Packard Commission recommendations. The most
dramatic change was the establishment of a new Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)). In
addressing the 25th Annual National Contract Management
Association (NCMA) Educational Conference held in Los
Angeles on 17 and 18 July 1986, Mr. David Packard stated
that DoD has the "largest acquisition job in the world,"
with no one in charge on a full time basis. He said there
needed to be a new Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (USD(A)). As a result of this Packard
Commission recommendation, Congress passed legislation to
establish the position which has been filled by Mr. Richard
Godwin. [Ref. 3:p. A-4
]
Many of the other recommendations will take more
time and coordination to implement. Secretary of Defense
Casper Weinberger tasked Deputy Secretary William Taft with
monitoring DoD's implementation of the Packard Commission
recommendations and coordinating the development of proposed





1. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Manage-
ment, A Quest for Excellence, June 1986.
2. "Defense Management: Packard Commission Submits
Detailed Report on Management of Defense Acquisition
Process," Government Contracts Service , v. 11-86,
15 June 1986.
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v. 14-86, 31 July 1986.
4. "Defense Management: President Directs DoD to Imple-
ment Packard Commission Recommendations," Government
Contracts Service , v. 9-86, 15 May 1986.
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C. COMPETITION IN ACQUISITION
The Characteristics and Analysis of competition in
acquisition must first begin with an accurate definition of
competition, a description of the different types of
competitive markets and their application in the Government
acquisition process. Competition is certainly not new to
Federal procurement. Almost since the founding of the
nation, competition has been the preferred method of
obtaining goods and services for the Government. More
recently President Reagan said, "Competition is fundamental
to our free enterprise system." [Ref. 1] Competition is
the rule and not the exception in Federal acquisition.
Any analysis of competition in acquisition should also
discuss the Government's position on competition, the
history of competition in Federal procurement, legislation
impacting and affecting competition, the benefits and
pitfalls of competition, and current initiatives to increase
competition in Government acquisition of all goods and
services, including major weapon systems.
The requirement for competition in the acquisition of
defense goods and services is expressed in congressional
legislation, regulations and instructions. The Armed
Services Procurement Act (ASPA) of 1947 requires that
contracts for goods and services be formally advertised or
competitively negotiated, whenever practicable. The
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) amended the
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ASPA and made sweeping changes to Federal procurement by
requiring full and open competition in all Government buys.
"Full and open" competition means that all responsible
sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive
proposals on the procurement. [Ref. 2:p. 0-1] The next
section focuses on the major competition initiatives




Competition is the healthy rivalry between firms in
the same industry fighting for the same business at the same
time. It provides the basic catalyst for efficiency,
innovation and growth in the economy. Competition is a
positive natural force that regulates the economy. In their
text book, Purchasing and Materials Management , Dobler, Lee
and Burt state that:
It has been proved repeatedly that the element of
competition, if not carried to extremes, acts as a
catalyst that elicits better performance from an indivi-
dual than would be the case without competition ....
A supplier who is the sole source of supply sooner or
later tends to become complacent with respect to such
captive business .... While there are some advantages
in dealing with a single supplier, for most items the
buyer can mitigate supplier problems (poor quality, late
deliveries, etc.) by consciously maintaining a healthy
competition among suppliers. [Ref. 3:pp. 124-125]
2. Types of Competitive Markets
Economists characterize markets by degrees of
competition. Using these classifications, they can develop
theories about the relationship of demand, supply and price
levels in different competitive market conditions. The
principal classifications are as follows:
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a. Perfect competition, which exists when there are many
sellers and buyers, the product is homogeneous and
perfectly interchangeable and the market price is
determined by supply and demand. The seller may
decide to sell or refuse to sell at the existing
price; he does not control the price. Some farm
products may be traded under conditions of perfect
competition.
b. Effective competition , which is the same as perfect
competition, except that the number of sellers is
limited. However, there must be enough sellers so
that no one seller dominates the market. All sellers
are independent and active rivals and new firms can
enter the market easily.
c. Monopolistic competition , which is the same as
perfect competition except that there is product
differentiation; that is, the sellers are able to
establish real or illusory differences among the
products they offer for sale. The seller is able
to control price to some degree if he can convince
buyers that his product is different from those of
other sellers. Much retail trade falls in this
category.
d. Oligopolistic competition , which exists when there
are few sellers and many buyers of products that have
degrees of difference. The seller, through adver-
tising and quality differentiation, is able to
control price to some extent. This kind of compe-
tition exists with steel and aluminum, for example,
where there may be little real difference in
product, and with automobiles, major appliances and
machinery through product differentiation.
e. Oligopsonlstic competition , which is like oligopolis-
tic competition, except that there are many sellers
and only a few buyers.
f. Monopoly , which exists where there is one seller and
many buyers of a product that has no close substi-
tutes. The seller has considerable control over
price, so much so that the prices of some sellers,
like utilities, are regulated. Monopoly also exists
when as with sole source military items, there is one
seller and one buyer. The seller's control over price
varies according to circumstances that determine his
bargaining strength.
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g. Monopsony, which exists when there are several
sellers and one buyer of interchangeable products.
Often the sellers tend to have little effective
control over price. [Ref. 4:pp. 98-99]
Federal Government purchases are made from firms who
fall into any one of these market categories. The diversity
of products purchased by the Government makes it almost
impossible to classify the Government marketplace into one
market classification. However in the acquisition of major
weapon systems, where components are highly specialized and
technical, the market structure has been described as a
bilateral monopoly. A bilateral monopoly exists when there
is only one seller and one buyer. DoD is the single buyer
of a highly complex weapon system developed by a single
seller. [Ref. 5:p. 1511
3. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)
legally mandates the use of competition in the procurement
of goods and services for the Federal Government. CICA
requires "full and open" competition in all Government
acquisitions. "Full and open" competition means that all
responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or
competitive proposals on the procurement. Contracting with
less than full and open competition is allowed only under
extreme circumstances. [Ref. 4:p. 95]
Reacting to "horror stories" of fraud, waste,
mismanagement and overpricing in the Federal acquisition
process, Congress passed numerous pieces of legislation to
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try to correct the deficiences. The legislation called for
more competition and less sole source contracting. In
addition to CICA, which overhauled and replaced a good
portion of the Armed Services Procurement Act and Title III
of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, the
Defense Procurement Reform Act and the Small Business and
Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act were passed
in 1984. In combination, these three new laws represented
the first true all encompassing reform of the procurement
statutes in 36 years. Congress passed the Deficit Reduction
Act, which included CICA, and President Reagan signed it
into law on 18 July 1984. In summary, CICA provided for the
following major changes in procurement policy and
regulations
:
a. Eliminates the preference for Formal Advertising,
which puts Competitive Negotiation on the same level
as Sealed Bid procedures. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
b. Eliminates the seventeen exceptions to Formal
Advertising and establishes the following seven new
exceptions under which "other than competitive
procedures" may be used:
(1) Property/services available only from one
source; no other type of property/service will
satisfy the need
(2) Unusual and compelling urgency
(3) Necessary to maintain the source for industrial
mobil ization
(4) Required by terms of an international agreement
or a request of a foreign government
(5) Expressly authorized by statute
(6) Disclosure of the need would compromise National
Security
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(7) Head of the Agency determines it is necessary
for Public Interest (30 days notice to Congress
before award) [Ref. 6:p. 36]
c. Requires Sealed Bid Procedures when the following
four conditions are met, otherwise competitive pro-
posals shall be requested:
(1) Time permits
(2) Award based on price, or price related factors
(3) Discussion with bidders was not necessary
(4) A reasonable expectation of receiving more
than one sealed bid [Ref. 6:p. 36]
d. Allows a head of an agency to exclude a particular
source of supply in competitive procedures in order
to establish or maintain an alternative source or
sources of supply. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
e. Allows agency heads to limit competition to small
business concerns only, as long as all firms within
that category are allowed to compete (with the excep-
tion of the 8(a) programs). [Ref. 6:p. 45]
f. Exempts Small Purchases (under $25,000) but stresses
that competition must still be promoted to the
maximum extent practicable. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
g. Lowers the threshold requiring certified cost or
pricing data under the Truth in Negotiations Act
from $500,000 to $100,000. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
h. Lengthens the required times for publishing pre-
solicitation notices and awards in the Commerce
Business Daily as follows:
(1) Requires pre-solicitation notices (synopses) of
prospective contracts to be published in the
Commerce Business Daily for at least 15 days
before solicitations are issued.
(2) Requires contract awards over $10,000 to be
published in the Commerce Business Daily when
subcontracts are likely. [Ref. 6:p. 37]
i. Requires the appointment of a "competition advocate"
within each executive agency. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
J. Requires each executive agency to submit an annual
report to Congress. [Ref. 6:p. 45]
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k. Authorizes GAO to decide protests and disputes con-
cerning alleged violations of the procurement laws
and regulations. [Ref. 6:p. 41]
4 . Competition in Major Weapon Systems Acquisition
The importance of competition in the acquisition of
major weapon systems cannot be overemphasized. The
Competition in Contracting Act requires competition to be
used throughout the entire acquisition cycle, during initial
development through production and logistics support.
Effective use of competition in weapon systems development
and production is difficult to achieve. But, when applied
correctly, competition can significantly reduce costs, help
manage risk and improve technical performance. [Ref. 2:p.
0-1]
The Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Act
of 1984, Public Law 98-212, requires that none of the funds
made available by the Act may be used to fund the full-scale
engineering development (FSED) of a major weapon system
until the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has provided the
following to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees:
a. a certification that the systems or subsystems
developed will be procured in quantities that are not
sufficient to warrant development of two or more pro-
duction sources, or
b. a plan for the development of two or more sources for
the production of the system or subsystem being
developed. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-3, 1-4]
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 14 and
DoD Supplement require competition in the acquisition of
goods and services. The Office of Management and Budget
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(OMB) Circular A-109 directs government agencies to use
competition whenever it is economical and beneficial. The
use of competition in acquiring major weapon systems
requires active management support, preplanning and market
research in the early stages of the acquisition process.
[Ref. 7:p. 156] The Competition in Contracting Act goes
even further by requiring competition in production as well
as in the development of major weapon systems. The program
manager (PM) of the weapon system is responsible for
achieving competition throughout the acquisition cycle, even
into production.
There are actually two different types of
competition in the acquisition of major weapon systems and
they must be distinguished. They are:
a. Design Competition - where firms compete by providing
different solutions to satisfy a mission need. This
occurs during a program's early design or validation
phase. Design competition allows the best technical
solution to be chosen. By its very nature, design
competition reduces total program cost.
[Ref. 8:p. 18]
b. Production Competition - normally used following
design competition, but can be used alone as can
design competition. Production competition is totally
different from competition for the best technical
design. Production competition requires the main-
tenance of multiple sources of the same or function-
ally identical equipment and increases the industrial
base as well. Effective production competition
should be planned during design competition, where
data rights, royalty payments and technology transfer
details can be worked out and successfully
negotiated. [Ref. 2:p. 1-11]
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Once the program manager (PM) has made the decision
to compete production, he/she must decide which technique to
use to establish a second source. The five techniques used
in DoD are:
3 3
a. Form, Fit and Function (F ) - The F technique
requires no involvement between the two production
sources. The solicitation of competing suppliers is
based on functional performance and external charac-
teristics such as size, weight and interface require-
ments. This procedure is known as the "black, box"
concept where the internal workings of the system are
unimportant. Competing sources can use different
internal designs to produce the same desired result.
b. Technical Data Package (TDP) - The TDP approach for
establishing a second production source involves the
use of a stand-alone technical data package to
solicit proposals from competing contractors. The
Government purchases the TDP from the original
developer. This can be done by exercising the data
rights clause in the development contract or by a
separate procurement. The data package must be
sufficient to stand alone to allow manufacture by
other contractors. The fact that this requirement
is very hard to fulfill makes this the riskiest of
all second sourcing methods.
[Ref. 9:p. 14]
c. Leader-Follower (L-F) - The leader-follower tech-
nique involves the direct transfer of technology
from one contractor to another. The leader company
assists the follower company in becoming a produc-
tion source by furnishing manufacturing assistance
and skills. The FAR requires these conditions to be
present for the use of the leader-follower technique:
(1) The leader company has the necessary production
know-how and is able to furnish required
assistance to the follower.
(2) No other source of supply can meet the
Government's requirement without the assistance
of a leader company.
(3) The assistance required of the leader company
is limited to that which is essential to enable
the follower company to produce the items.
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(4) Its use is authorized in accordance with agency
procedures. [Ref. 2:p. 2-9]
The FAR identifies these three ways of developing the
leader-follower relationship:
(1) Award the prime contract to the leader company
who is then obligated to subcontract a desig-
nated portion of the prime contract to a
specified follower company, and assist the
follower in producing the end items.
(2) Award a prime contract to the leader company to
provide the needed assistance to the follower
company, and award another prime contract to the
follower company for production of the end
items
.
(3) Award a prime contract to the follower company
for the end items who then must subcontract
with a specified leader company for the
necessary assistance. [Ref. 2:p. 2-9]
d. Directed Licensing (DL) - The directed licensing
technique involves the inclusion of a clause in the
development contract which allows the Government to
compete follow-on production contracts, select a
winner and appoint the winner as a licensee. The
Government then directs the developer, who is now
the licensor, to provide technical assistance and
production manufacturing data to the licensee in
exchange for royalties or fees. The licensing
agreement enables another company to become a pro-
ductive second source. [Ref. 9:p. 15]
e. Contractor Teaming (CT) - In contractor teaming,
a team of two major contractors are chosen to design
and test a system through FSED. Each member of the
team designs, develops and fabricates components and
subsystems of the system. Then they exchange
engineering and manufacturing expertise with each
other so that each contractor can produce the entire
system alone. Once each team member is qualified,
the team is split up and the two contractors compete
for production awards. [Ref. 9:p. 16]
5
. Benefits of Competition
Competition's foremost advantage is that it saves
taxpayer dollars. Competition drives prices down leading to
more realistic pricing, fewer cost overruns and reduced
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program costs. On the average, a cost savings of 25% is
realized by moving from a noncompetitive environment to a
competitive one. [Ref. 4:p. 99]
In addition to providing more economic procurements,
competition provides the following potential benefits:
a. broadens the industrial base by expanding the number
of sources for supplies and services.
b. provides equitable sales opportunities to all
responsible sources.
c. deters waste.




f. results in better quality.
g. results in better contractor designs,
h. speeds programs.
i. attracts innovative ideas.
j. widens the technological base.
k. reduces the need for obtaining certified cost or
pricing data from prospective contractors and
subcontractors
.
1. simplifies contract administration.
m. helps to improve management.
n. makes the procurement process less complex.
o. reduces Congressional criticism.
p. reduces appearances of favoritism.
q. restores public confidence. [Ref. 4:pp. 99-100]
44
6. Conclusion
Competition is here to stay in Government
acquisition. Thybony describes the situation best in this
quote: "Maximum competition is the rule in Federal
procurement. The Congress demands it; the President
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D. WEAPON SYSTEMS WARRANTIES
The Characteristics and Analysis of weapon systems
warranties must begin with the definition of a warranty, a
description of the different types of warranties and how
warranties apply to the acquisition of major weapon systems.
The analysis should include a discussion of recent
Congressional legislation mandating warranty coverage in all
major weapon systems acquisitions.
Warranty usage has been common practice in industry for
many years, but the Federal Government has just recently
shifted the quality and performance risk, of major weapon
systems to the contractor on a large scale basis. Prior to
the passage of Section 2403 to Title 10 United States Code,
the Weapon Systems Warranty Act, the Government was self-
insured. The shift in risk assumption from the Government
to the weapon systems contractor makes the seller liable for
the proper quality and performance of the weapon system.
These warranties do not come without cost to the Government.
The contractor charges the Government for warranty coverage,
so in order to take full advantage of the benefits of
warranty coverage, the Government must manage warranties
carefully. This next section focusses on the warranty





To adequately understand warranty issues, one must
first understand what a warranty is. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation provides this definition:
A warranty means a promise or affirmation given by a
contractor to the government regarding the nature, use-
fulness, or conditions of supplies or performance of
services furnished under the contract. [Ref. 1:46.701]
According to Cibinic and Nash:
The term warranty is used in a number of contexts. Its
most restrictive meaning occurs in the traditional
Government contract warranty clause (less frequently
referred to as a Guaranty clause) simply gives the
Government a remedy for patent defects discovered after
acceptance. The reason for including such a clause is to
overcome the finality of acceptance. [Ref. 2:p. 649]
They go on to say that in the commercial world,
. . . a warranty is a promise of the seller regarding the
quality of the goods. In this sense the term is used to
determine when a defect exists rather than to provide a
remedy for the defect. [Ref. 2:p. 649]
Basically a warranty is a guaranty from the seller
to the buyer that the warrantied product will not fail
during the warranty coverage period. If it does fail, the
seller will repair or replace the item. "With this
assumption of additional risk, the seller generally charges





With the passage of the 1984 Defense Appropriations
Act, specifically Section 794, Congress mandated warranty
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use for weapon systems. Section 794 states that:
No funds . . . may be obligated or expended for the pro-
curement of a weapon system unless the prime contractor or
other contractors for such a system provide the United
States with written guaranties. [Ref. 4:p. 154]
Written warranties now have the following
requirements
:
1. Weapon systems and components must conform to con-
tractual performance requirements.
2. The weapon system and its components are to be free
from defects that would cause failure to meet per-
formance requirements.
3. In the event of failure, the contractor will bear
the cost of achieving required performance. This
particular reform was one of the initial actions of
Congress to direct day to day procurements in DoD.
[Ref. 5]
As part of the 1985 Defense Appropriations Bill,
Congress amended the warranty legislation to make the 1984
Act more workable. "The new law, Section 2403 to Title 10
of the United States Code, directed the DoD to implement
warranties on major weapon systems where warranties proved
cost effective." [Ref. 3:p. 27] A cost-benefit analysis
must be conducted to determine if use of the warranty would
be cost-effective. This analysis must take into
consideration the life cycle cost of the weapon system with
and without a warranty.
3
. Types of Warranties
Warranties are broke into two categories: implied
and express. An implied warranty infers that the seller
maintains title to the product, he has the authority to sell
it, the product meets the standards of that particular
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industry and it is suitable for use. The implied warranty
is the standard warranty used in commercial business. On
the other hand, an express warranty means the seller
guaranties that the material delivered will meet the
description on the order or the required performance. [Ref.
6:p. 589]
The two subsets of warranties which are most
frequently used within the Federal Government are: design
warranties and performance warranties. For example, if a
contractor guaranties that the design of a product meets the
specifications provided by the buyer, it is a design
warranty. But, if a contractor guaranties that the product
will perform its intended function at a certain level for a
specified period of time, it is a performance warranty.
[Ref. 7:p. 25]
Three express warranties commonly used within DoD
are: the Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW), the Mean
Time Between Failure Guaranty (MTBF), and the Logistic
Support Cost Commitment (LSC). There are many more types of
warranties in use within the Government, but these are the
most common. A complete list of warranties used within DoD
can be found in the Product Performance Agreement Guide .
[Ref. 8:p. 4-12]
4
. Benefits of Warranties
Warranties provide many benefits if they are
properly managed. Some of the possible advantages of
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warranties which could be realized at the working level are
listed below.
a. Direct or indirect motivation for designing and pro-
ducing reliable and maintainable equipment.
[Ref. 9:p. 5-621
b. Reduced initial requirements for support equipment,
training, and data. [Ref. 9:p. 5-62]
c. Reduced initial logistics problem if contractor repair
is at "black box" level. [Ref. 9:p. 5-62]
d. Long-term stabilized workflow for contractor repair
work and increased chances for follow-on procure-
ments. [Ref. 9:p. 5-62]
e. Control of operational rather than test parameters.
[Ref. 9:p. 5-62]
f. Trade-off potential for guaranty of higher-level
parameters, e.g., logistics support costs.
[Ref. 9:p. 5-62]
g. Extention of contractor's responsibility to field per-
formance. Without a written warranty, the Govern-
ment assumes all the risks for product performance
and support. Under warranty both the Government
and the contractor share the risks and rewards.
[Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
h. Improvement of performance, reliability, and quality.
If contractors are committed to correcting warranty
breaches at their expense, they have a strong moti-
vation to meet or exceed levels of performance.
[Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
i. Reduction of life cycle costs. Contractors are
motivated to reduce repair costs to minimize their
liability. This could result in a corresponding
reduction of support costs for the Government.
[Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
j. Early and rapid resolution of problems. Due to the
warranty agreement and possible liabilities, problem
areas receive high visibility and gain management
attention. [Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
k. Incentive for no-cost engineering change proposals.
[Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
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1. Realistic estimates of field performance. If con-
tractor projections are overly optimistic, funds from
a warranty can be depleted rapidly and profits
reduced. [Ref. 10:p. 2-11
m. Improved evaluation of field performance. The con-
tractor is motivated to participate in the early
evaluation of field failures. [Ref. 10:p. 2-1]
All of these benefits will not be realized on any
one program, but overall, enough will be realized to make
warranties worthwhile in most cases. The key to a
successful warranty program in the Federal Government is
proper management attention.
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E. SOURCE SELECTION
The Characteristics and Analysis of source selection in
the Government acquisition cycle must begin with a
definition of source selection, its purpose, a description
of the source selection process, and the responsibilities of
the key players in the process. The analysis should include
the applicability of source selection in the Government
acquisition process and its importance in the acquisition of
major weapon systems.
Source selection in a competitively negotiated
procurement is one of the most costly and controversial
aspects of the Government acquisition process. Improper
source selection procedures continue to be the most
frequently cited allegation in protests in the awarding of
negotiated Government contracts. It is reasonable to
understand why. Many of the contractors protesting these
awards depend on Government contracts for their livelihood.
The consequences of not receiving the award are great and
they have little to lose by protesting. The increasing
number of award protests due to allegations of improper
source selection procedures could mean that the system needs
some improvement. This next section describes the source
selection process in competitively negotiated Government




According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), the principal objectives of the source selection
process are to:
(a) Maximize competition;
(b) Minimize the complexity of the solicitation, evalua-
tion, and the selection decision;
(c) Ensure impartial and comprehensive evaluation of
offerors' proposals; and
(d) Ensure selection of the source whose proposal has the
highest degree of realism and whose performance is
expected to best meet stated Government requirements.
[Ref. 2:15.603]
Source selection procedures should be "flexible and tailored
to the requirements of the specific acquisition so as to
minimize the cost of the process to Government and
industry." [Ref. 3:p. 2] Price or cost to the Government
should always be an evaluation factor in source selection.
2 Source Selection Players and Responsibilities
The Source Selection Authority (SSA) is responsible
for the proper conduct of the source selection process. The
SSA is responsible for:
a. making sure the source selection plan and the evalua-
tion criteria are consistent and accurately reflect
the intent of the statement of work.
b. appointing experienced personnel to the Source Selec-
tion Advisory Council (SSAC) and the Source Selection
Evaluation Board (SSEB), in the case of major weapon
systems procurements.
c. making sure conflicts of interest, or the appearance
thereof, do not occur.
d. making and documenting the final selection decision.
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The Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) is
appointed by the SSA for advice and to prepare a comparative
analysis of the evaluation results in major weapon systems
acquisitions
.
The Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) is
responsible for evaluating the proposals and reporting their
results to the SSAC in the acquisition of major weapon




The source selection plan is an integral part of the
overall acquisition strategy. The acquisition strategy
encompasses the entire acquisition process from needs
determination to post production support in major weapon
systems acquisitions. The source selection plan includes
the evaluation criteria to be used in selecting a
contractor
.
The source selection plan typically has two
sections: (1) the organization, membership, and
responsibilities of the source selection team and (2) a
description of the evaluation criteria and detailed
procedures for evaluation of the proposals. Source
selection information is confidential and must be protected
to avoid unauthorized disclosure to ensure equality and
fairness in the source selection process.
4 Evaluation Criteria
Evaluation criteria serve to inform the offerors of
the importance placed by the Government on different aspects
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of the proposal. Evaluation criteria consist of:
. . . a list of those aspects of a proposal that will be
evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively to arrive at an
integrated assessment as to which proposal can best meet
the Government's need as described in the solicitation.
[Ref. 3:p. 5]
To ensure proper fairness, evaluation criteria and their
importance must come from the statement of work. In
addition, this information must be furnished to all
potential offerors in the solicitation. Cost is always an
evaluation criterion In source selection, but it often is
not the overriding criterion in selecting contractors in the
development of major weapon systems. As a criterion in
development source selection, cost is given an order of
importance in relation to the other criteria. This guidance
allows the offeror to make intelligent tradeoffs between
cost and mission requirements in his/her proposal. As cost





Proposal evaluation must be done in a fair and
unbiased manner. Proposals must be evaluated based on the
relative importance of the evaluation criteria. The source
selection official, or the SSEB in major weapon systems
procurements, evaluates only one proposal at a time and does
not compare the merits of one proposal with another. No
prescribed rating methodology exists. What matters is that
proposals are rated consistently against the evaluation
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criteria. In evaluating proposals, the "evaluators must
consider the technical, schedule, operational readiness and
support, and financial risks inherent in a proposal." [Ref.
3:p. 9] Evaluators may assess the risk, of a proposal by
reviewing the offeror's past performance. Proposals must be
compared against independent cost estimates which are often
Government estimates. Cost estimates must also be evaluated
regarding cost realism and reasonableness. Cost realism
means "The Government's objective is to pay a fair and
reasonable price for work performed under contracts." [Ref.
3:p. 9]
6 . Clarifications and Negotiations
The contracting officer is responsible for
communicating with all offerors concerning their proposals.
Clarifications can be initiated by either the offeror or the
contracting officer to eliminate minor discrepancies or
obvious clerical errors in the proposal. Clarification does
not allow the offeror to change his/her proposal. According
to the FAR, a deficiency "means any part of a proposal that
fails to satisfy the Government's requirements." [Ref.
2:15.601] DoD Directive 4105.62 states that:
Deficiencies that clearly are understood by the evalua-
tors and cannot be corrected without a major revision
or a fundamental change in the technical approach pro-
posed by the offeror shall be evaluated as proposed.
[Ref. 3:p. 9]
"Discussions must be completed before a request for
best and final offers. Negotiations are completed when best
and final offers are received." [Ref. 3:p. 9] The final
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steps include the SSAC's recommendation and the SSA's source
selection decision and notification of award.
7. Conclusion
Source selection will always be a major step in the
award of Government contracts. In order to reduce the
number of awards that are criticized and even overturned as
a result of protests, the Government acquisition
professional must be extremely careful to structure and
follow source selection procedures to the letter. Increased
numbers of award protests negatively impacts the mission and
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The Characteristics and Analysis of delays must begin
with a definition of a delay in contractor performance, the
different categories of delays and what constitutes an
excusable delay. The analysis should also include a
discussion of how delays in contractor performance affect
the Government and who bears the risk, as well as the cost.
Delays in contractor performance cost the Government
time as well as taxpayer's dollars every year. Military
readiness as well as Governmental efficiency suffers. Some
delays are for good reasons and are excusable. Other delays
are caused by contractors who enter into a contract with the
Government knowing full well they will not be able to
deliver on time. [Ref. l:p. 409] Still others are caused
by a combination of Government and contractor action or
inaction. Each must be treated carefully and promptly.
The next section discusses the different types of
excusable delays in contractor performance and who bears the
risk of time and cost.
1 . Discussion
Delays in contractor performance cause problems for
both the Government and the contractor. In determining who
bears the risk of both the time and cost of these delays,
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the Suspension of Work, Government Delay of Work, and Stop
Work Order clauses, are used to allocate the risk. These
clauses deal separately with the time and cost effects of
delays. According to Cibinic and Nash,
The contractor bears the risk of both time and cost for
delays which he causes or which are within his control.
Generally he is excused from non-performance because of
delays caused by factors for which neither he nor the
Government is responsible. However, he must bear the
cost impact of such delays. The Government is responsible
for both the time and cost effect of delays which it
causes, which are under its control, or for which it has
agreed to compensate the contractor. [Ref. l:p. 409]
They go on to say that, "the interpretation of these clauses
has resulted in a rather precise scheme of risk allocation
for delays." [Ref. l:p. 409]
2 . Excusable Delays
The excusable delays provision protects the
contractor from sanctions for late performance, such as
termination for default, liquidated damages, actual damages,
or excess costs of reprocurement or completion. According
to Cibinic and Nash,
The fact that a delay is caused by one of the causes
specifically referred to in the Default clause is, by
itself, insufficient to justify the granting of an
excusable delay. [Ref. l:p. 412]
a. General Requirements
In order for a delay to be excusable, it must
meet the following provisions.
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(1) Unforeseeable. Foreseeability is defined as
having knowledge or a reason to know prior to bidding.
According to Cibinic and Nash:
A contractor is expected to know or have reason to know
of the facts that are within the scope of its business
operations pertaining to or possibly affecting its
contract. However, the mere possibility that an event
might occur does not establish foreseeability.
[Ref. l:p. 4121
( 2) "Beyond the Control" of the Contractor .
This is the prudent businessperson concept. If the
contractor could have prevented the delay, then it is within
his control. This concept can be applied in three ways.
Cibinic and Nash describe them as follows:
If an event is considered to be foreseeable at the time of
contracting and the contractor enters into the contract
without making provisions to protect itself, it is not
beyond his control because he assumed the risk of the
event. The second application deals with events which the
contractor could prevent from occurring. Such events are
not beyond the contractor's control. Finally, events may
be beyond the contractor's control if he could have over-
come the effects of the event. [Ref. l:p. 415]
( 3
)
Without the Contractor's Fault or Negli-
gence . In addition to the other two requirements, the delay
must be without the contractor's fault or negligence.
According to Cibinic and Nash, "'Fault or negligence' deals
with acts or omissions of the contractor which cause delay."
[Ref. l:p. 418]
( 4 Result in an Actual Delay in Delivery .
Finally, in order for a delay to occur, it must result in an
actual delay in delivery.
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b. Enumerated Causes of Delay
The contractor is entitled to an excusable delay
for certain types of events which are enumerated, or spelled
out, in the clauses. These events are appropriately called
enumerated causes of delay. The are listed and discussed
below.
(1) Strikes . Delays caused by strikes by a
contractor's own employees or by a subcontractor's
employees, are generally excusable.
In order to obtain an excusable delay for a strike, a
contractor must prove that he acted reasonably by not
wrongfully precipitating or prolonging the strike and
took steps to avoid its effect. [Ref. l:p. 419]
(2) Weather . In both supply and construction
contracts, unusually severe weather is a cause for excusable
delay. Cibinic and Nash define unusually severe weather as
" weather that is abnormal compared to the past
weather at the same location for the same time of year."
[Ref. l:p. 420] In addition, the weather reports and
statistics used must be taken from the location of
performance. They are usually compared with United States
weather statistics for the same area over the past few
years. [Ref. l:p. 421]
(3) Government Acts . Government acts may be
either contractual or sovereign acts. For a contractor to
have an excusable delay due to a contractual act by the
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Government, "... the contractor must prove that the
Government act causing the delay was wrongful." [Ref. l:p.
424]
Sovereign acts are those taken by the Government
which affect the general public as well as the contractor.
"Sovereign acts which delay the contractor's performance are
grounds for excusable delays." [Ref. l:p. 427]
( 4 ) Subcontractor and Supplier Delays .
According to Cibinic and Nash,
When the delay is caused by problems encountered by a
subcontractor or supplier, the contractor has an added
burden in establishing excusabil i ty . Under the clauses
currently in use, a delay by a subcontractor at any tier
is not excusable to the contractor unless it is also ex-
cusable to the subcontractors at each tier. Thus, before
the contractor can be excused, it must be shown that the
cause of delay was beyond the control and without the
fault or negligence of the contractor and all intervening
contractors including the delayed subcontractor ....
Thus, if a subcontractor fails to deliver due to a dis-
pute between it and the contractor, the resulting delay
will not be excusable since it will be considered to be
the fault of the parties .... Delays caused by sole
source subcontractors, even those designated by the
Government, do not qualify for excusable delays if the
subcontractor is at fault. [Ref. l:p. 428]
(5) Floods . For a flood to be grounds for an
excusable delay, the "'flood' must involve an overbank flow
of water and that mere soaking or runoff was insufficient."
[Ref. l:p. 432]
(6) Fires . For a fire to be grounds for an
excussable delay, the fire must directly affect the
contractor or subcontractor. [Ref. l:p. 432]
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(7) Epidemics . For an epidemic to be grounds
for an excusable delay, the epidemic must directly affect
completion of the contract.
(8) Freight Embargoes . For a freight embargo to
be grounds for an excusable delay, the embargo must directly
affect the completion of the contract.
(9) Acts of God . An act of God is defined "as a
'singular, unexpected and irregular visitation of a force of
nature' in" determining whether an act of God can be grounds
for an excusable delay. [Ref. l:p. 433]
c. Non-enumerated Causes of Delay
Some causes of delay are not spelled out in the
contract clauses, and are called non-enumerated causes of
delay. The courts must then decide whether the delay will
be considered excusable.
The courts have taken a very restrictive view of the types
of non-enumerated events which will be classified as ex-
cusable. Thus, absent an underlying cause specifically
enumerated in the contract, delays caused by a lack of or
inability to obtain know-how, material, personnel, money
or machines are very difficult to establish as excusable.
In almost all cases where such delays have been held ex-
cusable, the contractor has had to demonstrate that
performance was at least a practical impossibility, a
test not usually applied to delays arising out of causes
specifically set forth in the clause. Whether this is so
because the contractor is considered to have assumed the
risk of the delay or because such matters are considered
not beyond the control of the contractor is not readily
apparent from the cases. [Ref. l:pp. 433-434]
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The following is a list of common non-enumerated
causes of delay. The courts take a very narrow view when
these causes are presented and requested to be accepted as
excusable causes of delay.
(1) Financial Difficulties
(2) Lack of Facilities and Equipment
(3) Lack of Materials





Delays in contractor performance cause management
problems for both the contractor and the Government. Risk
allocation is determined by the applicable delay clauses in
the contract. Delays in contractor performance adversely
affect the readiness of the armed forces and the Government
in doing its job. While some delays are the fault of the
contractor, many are caused by a combination of both
Government and contractor actions and/or inactions. All
cases of delay need to be handled carefully and promptly to
avoid further delays or misunderstandings. Government and
industry contracting professionals should put more attention
on preventing delays before they occur.
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B. THE ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS (ASBCA)
The Characteristics and Analysis of the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) must begin with a
description of the board and its functions. A discussion of
the ASBCA would include the effect of the Contract Disputes
Act of 1978 and a description of the disputes procedure.
The Government's policy is to settle all contractor
disputes and appeals at the contracting officer's level.
Resolving differences by informal discussions strengthens
the Government's relationships with its contractors. Every
attempt to reach a mutual agreement should be made. Claims
and disputes are costly to both the Government and the
contractor. In addition to being costly, disputes are time
consuming, and both parties would benefit by agreeing before
a dispute arises. [Ref. l:p. 85]
The next section describes the ASBCA and its role in the
Government contract disputes process.
1 . Discussion
Most Government acquisitions are completed as
planned. However, disagreements and misunderstandings arise
from time to time. Contracting officers have been trained
to try to resolve these differences before the contractor
files an appeal or a claim.
The disputes procedure used to resolve the
differences between the contractor and the Government is an
administrative means of resolving contract issues. The
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facts are presented in hearings before an administrative
board (the ASBCA). This disputes procedure is the
traditional method of resolving differences arising between
the contractor and the contracting officer. "Other remedies
that might be used are (1) a request for relief to the
General Accounting Office, (2) a suit in Federal court, and





The ASBCA was created in 1949 to handle the growing
number of disputes caused by the increased volume of
procurements. The original ASBCA consisted of three panels,
one for each military service. In 1969 a new charter
established one board for the entire Defense Department,
comprised of attorneys qualified in contract law. Members
of the Board are designated Administrative Judges. The
Secretary of Defense appoints a chairman and two or more
vice-chairmen from the Board members. The ASBCA follows
Board rules established by the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP). The chairman subdivides the ASBCA membership
in order to handle the case workload. [Ref. l:p. 80]
3. The Contract Disputes Act of 1978
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-
653, effective 1 November 1978) established procedures and
requirements for resolving disputes arising from a
Government contract. The Commission on Government
Procurement Report contained thirteen recommendations on the
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resolution of contract disputes. [Ref. 2:p. 145] The Act
incorporated the major features of the system recommended by
the Commission. In its final version, the bill was
supported by all major Government agencies, bar associations
and contractor groups. The Act is implemented in Part 33 of
the FAR.
Prior to the Act, breaches of contract which were by
definition outside the scope of the contract, and therefore
outside of the administrative process and contracting
officer's authority, were tried in the courts. Disputes
which by definition were inside the scope of the contract
and therefore inside the administrative process, were under
the authority of the contracting officer and the ASBCA.
Although breaches and disputes involved essentially the same
contract matter, one was adjudicated by the courts while the
other by ASBCA.
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 brought about many
changes. Virtually all parties that traditionally had been
advocating changes to the old system benefitted. [Ref.
2:p. 145] Some of the major provisions of the Act are:
[Ref. 2:pp. 145-160]
(1) Establishes an "all disputes" provision eliminating
the sometimes confusing distinction between disputes
arising "under" the contract and those in breach of
the contract, "outside" the contract. All fall
within administrative procedures under the authority
of the contracting officer.
(2) Gives contractors the option of appealing directly
to the courts, bypassing the ASBCA.
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(3) Strengthens the ASBCA by giving the clear grant of
subpoena, discovery and deposition powers.
(4) Gives the procuring agencies more flexibility in
negotiating and settling contract disputes.
(5) Enhances the ASBCA's ability to attract and retain
competent and experienced members by raising the
grades to the super grade level.
(6) Benefits the judicial process by adding flex-
ibility to the Court of Claims to either take new
evidence on appeals necessary to dispose of a case,
or to remand the case to the Board.
(7) Recognizes the Government's right to seek judicial
review of adverse Board decisions.
(8) Establishes time limits for contracting officer's
decisions
.
(9) Establishes "expedited" procedures for handling
small claims (less than $10,000) by ASBCA. Decision
in 120 days or less.
(10) Contains statutory requirement for interest on
claims
.
(11) Establishes "accelerated" procedures for handling of
disputes less than $50,000 by ASBCA. Decision in
180 days or less.
(12) Establishes an additional penalty for fraudulent
claims to deter the filing of exaggerated claims
and try to shore up the sanctions.
(13) Requires a certificate for claims over $50,000.
4 . The Disputes Process
Figure 3-1 provides an overview of the disputes
process. [Ref. 3:p. 949] The major steps in the process
are outlined below.
a. Contractor Claims
Contractors must submit claims to the
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writing, and if it exceeds $50,000, the claim must also be
certified stating that:
(1) the claim is made in good faith;
(2) supporting data are accurate and complete to the best
of the contractor's knowledge and belief; and
(3) the amount requested accurately reflects the contract
adjustment for which the contractor believes the
government is liable. [Ref. 3:p. 307]
b. Contracting Officer's Decision
Sometimes claims by or against a contractor
cannot be resolved by a mutual understanding and agreement.
In that case, the contracting officer must make a decision
on the claim. In doing so the contracting officer must:
(1) review the facts pertinent to the claim;
(2) secure assistance from legal and other advisors;
(3) coordinate with the contract administration office or
contracting office, as appropriate; and
(4) prepare a written decision that includes a:
(a) description of the claim or dispute;
(b) reference to the pertinent contract terms;
(c) statement of the factual areas of agreement
or disagreement;
(d) statement of the contracting officer's
decision, with supporting rationale; and
(e) notice that it is the contracting officer's
final decision, which may be appealed to
either the U.S. Claims Court or to the
appropriate board of contract appeals. (ASBCA)
[Ref. 4:pp. 307-308]
c. Timeliness of Appeals
The contractor may appeal the contracting
officer's decision to the ASBCA or the U.S. Claims Court.
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If the contractor decides to appeal to the ASBCA, he/she
mast do so in writing within 90 days from the date of the
contracting officer's final decision.
If the contractor decides to bring action
directly to the U.S. Claims Court, he/she must do so within
12 months of receiving the contracting officer's final
decision. [Ref. 4:p. 308]
d. Time Limitations on Contracting Officer's
Decisions
Contracting officer's final decisions must be
made within the following limitations:
(1) Claims of $50,000 or less—within 60 days after
receiving a written request from the contractor, or a
reasonable period if no request is received.
(2) Claims over $50,000—within 60 days after receiving
a certified claim or notify the contractor when a
final decision will be made.
When the contracting officer does not issue a
final decision within a reasonable amount of time, the
contractor has the right to request the ASBCA to direct the
contracting officer to issue a final decision within a
specific time frame. [Ref. 4:pp. 308-309]
e. ASBCA Procedures
(1) Small Claims Procedures—If the claim is $10,000
or less, the contractor may request the expedited
procedure which requires a decision within 120 days.
The decision will be final and the contractor loses
his/her right to appeal an unfavorable decision.
(2) Accelerated Procedures—If the claim is $50,000 or
less, the contractor can request the accelerated
procedure which requires a decision within 180 days.
The contractor retains all rights to appeal an un-
favorable decision.
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(3) Regular Procedures--I f the claim exceeds $50,000, a
full board hearing will be held. A contractor with
a claim of $50,000 or less may also elect the
regular procedure. [Ref. 4:p. 309]
f. ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court Decisions
ASBCA decisions are final unless appealed to
the U.S. Claims Court by either the Government or the
contractor within 120 days from receipt of the Board's
decision. When an ASBCA decision is appealed, the U.S.
Claims Court rules on questions of law, and only looks to
see if the decision was "... fraudulent, arbitrary,
capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply
bad faith, or if such decision is not supported by
substantial evidence." [Ref. 4:p. 309-310] The ASBCA
decision regarding any question of fact is final, however,
the Court can take additional evidence or remand the case to
the ASBCA for further hearing of new evidence.
5 . Conclusion
The Government prefers to resolve all contract
differences before they enter the disputes process.
Disputes are costly for all concerned, not only in terms of
dollars but in time and business relationships. The
contracting officer and contractor should do everything
possible to prevent misunderstandings from going into the
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IV. FINANCE. ECONOMICS AND ACCOUNTING SUBJECTS
A. WEIGHTED GUIDELINES FOR PROFIT
The Characteristics and Analysis of Weighted Guidelines
for profit must begin with a description of the Weighted
Guidelines (WGLs) method of profit analysis and a discussion
of the recent changes to the policy which became effective
18 October 1986.
The WGLs method for establishing profit policy is DoD's
structured approach for determining profit or fee objectives
in acquisitions that require cost analysis. The purpose of
the WGLs analytical techniques is to " . . . establish
conditions to simulate the marketplace and give
approximately the same results." [Ref. l:p. 4-1] The Armed
Services Pricing Manual (ASPM) describes WGLs as follows:
This method of establishing profit objectives promises
higher or lower profit depending on the skills and re-
sources needed to perform the contract, the amount of
cost risk assumed by the contractor, the facilities
capital investment required, and other, special factors.
[Ref. l:p. 4-2]
Since the new WGLs were implemented on 18 October 1986,
the special factors have been deleted and the three major
profit categories are now: (1) Performance Risk, (2)
Contract Type Risk, and (3) Facilities Capital Employed.
The new profit policy differs dramatically from the old
policy in some areas. For instance, the emphasis has
shifted from cost as a basis for computing profit to
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facilities capital employed. Because of changes to the
profit policy, contracting professionals in both Government
and industry will find it necessary to adjust their
attitudes toward contractor risk versus profit to be
negotiated.
The next seciton will discuss the new Weighted
Guidelines and how they affect the contracting officer as
well as the contractor.
1 . Discussion
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires
Government agencies to use a structured method for analyzing
and determining profit or fee objectives in acquisitions
requiring cost analysis. WGLs, which first became effective
1 January 1964, is the method established by the DoD FAR
Supplement (DFARS) to be used within DoD. According to the
ASPM , the profit policy is to promote these objectives:
a. Reward contractors who take on the more difficult
tasks requiring higher skills.
b. Encourage them to accept greater contract cost
responsibility by establishing substantially different
profit levels for different pricing arrangements and
different cost-risk situations.
c. Encourage them to make cost-effective capital
investments
.
d. Encourage them to use nongovernment resources.
[Ref. l:p. 4-2]
The WGLs for profit is DoD's way of attempting to
achieve a uniform and consistent method for contracting
officers to develop prenegotiation profit objectives,
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whenever cost analysis is used in preparing for a contract
negotiation. There are some exceptions as follows:
a. Architect-engineering contracts
b. Management contracts for operation and maintenance of
Government facilities
c. Construction contracts




g. Contracts expected to be $500,000 or less
h. Unusual situations, determined by the head of the
contracting activity, which would not result in a
reasonable profit objective CRef. 2:p. 2]
2 . The Defense Financial and Investment Review
The Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR),
an 18-month joint-service study of DoD contract profit
policies and contract financing, recommended sweeping
changes to the WGLs method of establishing prenegotiation
profit objectives in defense contracts. The DFAIR project
was chartered by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December
1983, and the project's final report was issued in May 1985.
Eleanor Spector (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Procurement) in testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Legislation and National Security stated that "what
contrasted most from prior DoD-wide reviews is that the
contracts financing and profit policies were examined on an
interrelated basis rather than as individual issues." [Ref.
3:p. A-18] She noted that DFAIR focused on two main
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objectives: (1) " . . . the project team was to measure
differences in profit between defense contracting and the
commercial marketplace," {Ref. 3:p. A-18] and (2) " . . .
the project team was to explore areas where there was a
potential for meaningful reform." [Ref. 3:p. A-18]
The DFAIR Study recommended that the Secretary of
Defense make significant changes to the DoD profit policy.
Secretary Taft screened the recommendations and directed the
Defense Acquisition (DAR) Council to draft the appropriate
regulatory language to direct the following:
a. Continue to use Weighted Guidelines (WGLs) method of
developing profit objectives.
b. Base profit on three areas: Performance risk, contract
type risk, facilities capital employed.
c. Encourage contractors to submit proposed profit
amounts using WGLs format to facilitate discussion of
individual profit amounts.
d. Encourage primes to use WGLs in developing subcon-
tractor profit objectives.
e. Transfer profit weighting from cost to facilities
capital investment.
f. Exclude G&A from allowable cost base for profit
calculation.
g. Eliminate most special profit factors.
h. Subcategor ize facilities capital by asset type (land,
buildings, equipment).
i. Establish a working capital adjustment factor for
fixed-price contracts.
j. Establish profit objectives and ranges for three
areas of profit considerations. [Ref. 2:pp. 1-2]
In direct contract to the old profit policy, the
DFARS encourages contractors to submit their proposed profit
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amounts to the Government using the new WGLs form. This
change is to facilitate discussion of profit factors during
negotiations. The DFARS also encourages contractors to use
the new WGLs form in negotiating profit with their
subcontractors. [Ref. 2:pp. 3-4]
3. The New Profit Policy
The new WGLs method uses a revised DD Form 1547,
entitled "Record of Weighted Guidelines Method Application."
A sample of DD Form 1547 is provided in Figure 4-1. The new






(4) Adjustment for Low-Facilities Capital
b. Contract Type Risk
(1) Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP), including working
capital adjustments




c. Facilities Capital Employed [Ref. 2:p. 4]
A brief discussion of each of the three major profit
categories and subcategories is presented in the next
section. It should be noted that under the new policy, the
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contracting officer is instructed to assign a profit
percentage which equals the average rate (known as the
normal value) unless a higher or lower rate (within limits)
can be adequately justified.
4 . Profit Categories
a. Category 1—Performance Risk
This category judges the contractor's amount of
performance risk. The range is 3-5% and the normal value is
4V The subcategories are: (1) technical considerations,
(2) management considerations, and (3) cost considerations.
Each subcategory is evaluated separately and then all are
averaged for a composite performance risk factor value. An
adjustment for low facilities capital exists for use where
research and development or service contractors have a
minimum of facilities capital but experience a significant
amount of performance risk. Values up to 6% may be assigned
to these contractors if circumstances warrant, but approval
must be obtained from the level above the contracting
officer, and the contractor must meet these criteria:
--Facilities capital allocations for buildings/equipment
is less than 2% of total contract costs (including
General and Administrative (G&A) and Independent
Research and Development (IR&D)/Bid and Proposal (B&P)
--Not in DoD's interest to place substantial incentive
on facilities capital investment
—Involves highly skilled and complex effort, such as
state-of-the-art R&D or highly specialized technical
services to Government-owned equipment/ facil ities
[Ref. 2:pp. 8-9]
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b. Category 2—Contract Type Risk.
This category evaluates the degree of risk and
cost responsibility assumed by the contractor in the
specific contract type. The highest value is assigned to
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts and the lowest value is
assigned to Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contracts. A
working capital adjustment factor must be computed for
fixed-price contracts in accordance with a formula provided
in the DFARS. [Ref. 4:15.9] The percentage ranges for each
type of contract are:
(1) Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts — 5-7%
(Normal — 6%)
(2) Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) contracts — 3-5%
(Normal — 4%)
(3) Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contracts — 1-3%
(Normal — 2%)
(4) Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF contracts — 0-.5%
(Normal — 0%)
[Ref. 2:pp. 9-13]
c. Category 3—Facilities Capital Employed
This category recognizes the contractor's
facilities capital to be utilized during contract
performance. Assets are categorized as follows, with ranges
and normal values:
(1) Land 0-0% (Normal — 0%)
(2) Buildings 5-15% (Normal — 10%)





The new WGLs procedures are a dramatic departure
from the old profit policy. The contracting officer must
now justify any deviations from the normal values when
evaluating the contractor's profit factors. The removal of
G&A, IR&D and B&P costs from the cost base will force
contractors to accurately direct charge expenses; and profit
will no longer be allowed on these overhead costs where
cases of questionable charges have occurred.
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B. DEFENSE FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT REVIEW (DFAIR) STUDY
The Characteristics and Analysis of the Defense
Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR) Study should include
the purpose of the study, and a discussion of its major
findings, conclusions and recommendations. In addition, the
analysis should describe reactions to the study by leaders
in DoD, and their subsequent actions as a result of the
study
.
The DFAIR Study was organized by DoD, in response to a
number of reviews and studies conducted during 1981 and 1982
regarding DoD's contract financing and profit policies.
DFAIR was tasked with reassessing DoD's policies toward
profit and contract financing in a rapidly changing
business environment. This next section will give the
reader an overview of the DFAIR Study, the initiatives it
was able to formulate, and the recommendations which have
been adopted.
1 . Discussion
On 2 December 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
chartered DFAIR to study and make recommendations to him
regarding DoD's contract pricing, financing and profit
policies. DFAIR's task was to determine if these policies
were,
. . . resulting in effective and efficient spending of
public funds and maintaining the viability of the defense
industrial base, and to make recommendations for improve-
ment. [Ref. l:p. E-l]
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In an appearance before the Subcommittee on
Legislatation and National Security of the House Committee
on Government Operations to discuss DFAIR, Eleanor Spector,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement,
stated that the study had two main objectives:
First, the project team was to measure differences in
profit between defense contracting and the commercial
marketplace. Second, the project team was to explore
areas where there was a potential for meaningful reform.
In both cases, findings and recommendations were to be
developed as a joint-service effort and presented for
Deputy Secretary Taft's consideration. [Ref. 2:p. A-18]
The DFAIR could not rely totally "... on
traditional profit techniques such as return on sales or
return on assets ..." because they "... would not
present a completely meaningful picture of relative
profitability." [Ref. 2:p. A-18] Spector goes on to say:
The DFAIR project team, therefore, supplemented these
traditional methods with an "economic profit" concept.
This concept essentially removed comparability distor-
tions that were caused by differeing contract financing
methods and their accounting method, as well as the
differeing mix of assets employed in the production of
goods and services. [Ref. 2:p. A-18]
The review was an 18-month joint-service project
which completed in May 1985. According to Spector, at the
end of the study, the " . . . team found that overall the
profitability of the defense industry was economically
balanced and provided a reasonable return for involvement in
defense contracting." [Ref. 2:p. A-19] The study examined
financial data covering a 14-year period. Spector felt
"
. . . the most significant finding was that the contract
financing and profit policy were poorly integrated and
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lacked adequate responsiveness to changes in the economy."
[Ref. 2:p. A-19] She also said there was room for reform in
the Weighted Guidelines method for developing negotiation
profit objectives currently in use by DoD contracting
officers. [Ref. 2:p. A-19]
2 . Findings, Recommendations and Decisions
This section discusses the seventeen findings and
recommendations of the DFAIR Study, and Deputy Defense
Secretary (DEPSECDEF) Taft's decisions regarding their
implementation.
a. Interest Expense
The DFAIR Study found that contractor interest
expense should not be an allowable contract cost. Even
though interest expenses are ordinary and necessary for
contractors to conduct defense business, the DFAIR Study
recommended that contractor interest expense should continue
to be an unallowable cost on defense contracts. As a result
of this recommendation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft
(DEPSECDEF) decided to continue to make interest an
unallowable cost.
b. Contract Financing and Profit Policy Integration
The DFAIR Study concluded that DoD's contract
financing and profit policies are not sufficiently
integrated. Members of the study recommended that the best
way to integrate the policies, would be to link the
application of progress payments with developing profit
objectives under the Weighted Guidelines (WGLs) Method. The
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contract price of DoD contracts would fluxuate up or down
based on the interest rate at the time. In addition, profit
would be aligned with actual financing requirements. Based
on the DFAIR Study recommendations, DEPSECDEF decided to
revise the profit policy to integrate contractor financing,
Government-furnished progress payments, and changes in the
interest rate. This recommendation was implemented in the
revised WGLs which became effective 18 October 1986.
c. Balance Between Profit and Progress Payments
The DFAIR Study felt that current DoD progress
payment and profit policies are not balanced enough to
compensate contractors for financing requirements. DFAIR
concluded that progress payments and profit policies should
be structured to reimburse contractors for financing. DFAIR
recommended that profit recognition be set at 2% and that
the progress payment rate be 85%. Since the completion of
the DFAIR Study, interest rates have dropped considerably.
For this reason, DEPSECDEF decided to leave the progress
payment rate at 80% and not to provide an offsetting
increase to the profit objective. DEPSECDEF later changed
the progress payment rate to 75% for large businesses and
80% for small businesses.
d. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Progress Payments
and Profit
DFAIR found that the progress payment rates
authorized on FMS contracts are too high and recommended
removing the differential between FMS and domestic
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contracts. The DEPSECDEF agreed and decided to remove the
differential. This action was completed with the new
revision of the WGLs effective 18 October 1986.
e. Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) Clause
DFAIR found that DoD has not effectively used
Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clauses during periods of
economic uncertainty. They recommended that EPA clauses be
used on all large dollar contract with a period of
performance of three years or longer. Secretary Taft agreed
to using EPA clauses for major elements of direct costs on
all large dollar contracts with a period of performance
three years or longer.
f. Small Business Customary Progress Payment Rate
DFAIR found that the progress payment rate for
small businesses was 90% versus 80% for large businesses.
They felt the 10% differential should be narrowed.
DEPSECDEF agreed with DFAIR's recommendation to restore the
5% differential by making the small business progress
payment rate 85%. DEPSECDEF has since reduced the small
business progress payment rate to 80%.
g. Flexible Progress Payments
DFAIR felt that the flexible progress payment
rate policy needed to be more closely calibrated with the
standard progress payment rate. As a result, DFAIR
recommended that the minimum level of contractor investment
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for computing flexible progress payments be set at 100%
minus the standard progress payment rate of 85%, which
equates to 15%. DEPSECDEF agreed to make this change.
h. Progress Payment Frequency
DFAIR concluded that the current DoD policy for
making progress payments no more than monthly is reasonable.
DEPSECDEF took DFAIR 's recommendation to keep the progress
payment frequency monthly.
i. Timing of Invoice and Financing Payments
DFAIR found that confusion existed about when to
pay invoice and financing payments to DoD contractors. The
two circumstances are quite different, and needed
clarification as when payments should be made. DFAIR
recommended that invoice payments should be made 30 days
after receipt of the contractor's invoice or the goods
and/or services whichever occurs later. They also
recommended that contract financing payments continue to be
made as soon as possible, within 5 to 10 days after receipt
of the progress payment request. Secretary Taft agreed to
implement DFAIR 's recommendations.
j. Milestone Billings
DFAIR found that milestone billings on long term
contracts, where deliveries were not made until late in the
period of performance, needed to be reinstated. DFAIR
recommended to Secretary Taft that milestone billings.
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including partial profit payments be restored. He agreed
with the DFAIR finding and directed the change to be made to
the DFARS.
k. Simplification of Weighted Guidelines (WGLs)
Method
DFAIR felt the WGLs Method of determining profit
objectives is too complicated and needed to be simplified.
As a result they recommended reducing the number of profit
factors and narrowing the range of factors. Secretary Taft
approved the recommendation and directed the changes which
became effective with the new WGLs on 18 October 1986.
1. Defense Acquisition Circular (DAC) 76-23
DFAIR found the current WGLs 3-column approach
for developing profit objectives is confusing and a
disincentive to investment in capital assets. They
concluded that the current approach caused an unintended
increase of .5% to 1% points in profit objectives, and
recommended rescinding DAC 76-23 and adopting a single
policy for all types of contract effort. This would reduce
profit objectives .5% to 1% points. This recommendation was
accepted by DEPSECDEF and implemented with the new WGLs
effective 18 October 1986.
m. Contract risk
The current contractor risk factor does not
include consideration for risk relating to contract period
of performance or contractor share of cost risk in incentive
type contracts. DFAIR recommended adjusting the risk factor
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to recognize the impact of length of contract and establish
a direct link, between risk, and the contractors' cost share
ratio. DEPSECDEF decided to recognize contract length as a
factor in determining profit objectives to redistribute
profit objective amounts between short and long-term
contracts. In addition, Secretary Taft decided to recognize
the link between risk and the contractors cost share of
overruns and underruns to redistribute profit objectives for
incentive type contracts by degree of cost risk sharing.
n. Profit on Facilities Capital Employed
DFAIR found that the current profit policy
provides equal reward to all fixed assets regardless of
their contribution to potential productivity increases.
DFAIR recommended establishing a lowest-to-highest priority
in the factors for fixed assets (as applied to net book
value of capital assets employed) as follows:
CURRENT FACTORS POSSIBLE REVISION
Land 16 - 20% 0-0% Lowest
Furniture/Fixtures 16 - 20% 4-8%
Buildings 16 - 20% 6 - 10%
Equipment 16 - 20% 16 - 20% Highest
DEPSECDEF decided to establish factors for
capital employed in relationship to the potential for cost
reduction, with land having the lowest factor and equipment
having the highest factor. The actual factor values
included in the newly revised WGLs which became effective 18
October 1986 are as follows: (1) Land—0%, (2) Buildings
—
5-15%, and (3) Equipment--25-35%.
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o. Profit on Indirect Expenses
DFAIR recommended eliminating general and
administrative (G&A) expenses from the cost base for
determining the profit objective and reducing profit factors
for overhead. Secretary Taft agreed with DFAIR's
recommendation and eliminated G&A expense from the cost base
for determining the profit objective and reduced factors for
overhead by 50%. This change was implemented in the new
WGLs effective 18 October 1986.
p. Special Factors
DFAIR felt that special factors in the current
WGLs were rarely used and were generally used as "fillers"
to generate extra profit. DEPSECDEF accepted the
recommendation from DFAIR to remove the special factors from
the profit policy. This change became effective on 18
October 1986 with implementation of the new WGLs.
q. Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 414, Cost of
Money on Facilities Capital
CAS 414 establishes criteria for the measurement
and allocation of the cost of capital committed to
facilities, as an element of contract cost. This is
referred to the "cost of money." DFAIR felt that the cost
of money should continue to be treated as an allowable cost.




The DFAIR Study made many important observations and
recommendations regarding contract pricing, financing and
profit policies. As discussed in the preceeding section,
Deputy Defense Secretary Taft followed almost all of the
DFAIR recommendations. The most sweeping change which has
resulted from DFAIR is the new Weighted Guidelines Method of
profit analysis which became effective 18 October 1986. It
is still too early to tell at this writing as to how the new
system is working out. Due to their few capital assets, the
services contractors are unhappy with the shift in emphasis
from a cost base to more of a facilities capital employed
basis for determining profit. Overall, it should
incentivize more contractors to invest in production




1. Department of Defense, Defense Financial and Investment
Review , June 1985.
2. "Financing: Spector Gives Overview of DFAIR Before
House Subcommittee," Government Contracts Service , Vol.
15-86, 15 August 1986.
3. "Deputy Defense Secretary Taft's Decisions Implementing
Recommendations in DFAIR Study," Federal Contracts
Report , Vol.45, 2 June 1986.
94
V. LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT SUBJECTS
A. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS)
The Characteristics and Analysis of Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) must begin with a definition of ILS and a
discussion of its role in the acquisition of major weapon
systems. The analysis should also include a description of
the ILS elements and how these ILS activities are
incorporated into the major systems acquisition process. In
addition, the analysis should present a discussion of the
key players and their responsibilities in the ILS process.
ILS planning must be incorporated early on in the
acquisition cycle of major weapon systems. In order for it
to be effective, ILS planning must begin at program
initiation and continue throughout the life cycle of the
system. The next section discusses the elements of an
effective ILS program and the importance of ILS in the





ILS is becoming increasingly important to managers
of complex weapon systems. To be able to perform
effectively, operational commanders must have adequate
logistics support. ILS " . . . is the management of a
system to ensure it operates as planned under the required
operational and support concepts." [Ref. l:p. 332]
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ILS planning begins at program initiation and
continues for the life of the system. System readiness is
essential to the acquisition process. "The primary
objective of the ILS program shall be to achieve system
readiness objectives at an affordable life-cycle cost."
[Ref. 2:p. 21 ILS is defined as:
. . . the integrating of the various logistics elements to
assist military weapons systems managers develop and
maintain a supportable defense throughout the systems'
entire life cycle, wartime or peacetime. [Ref. l:p. 332]
ILS planning begins in the early design phases of a
major weapon system. Logistics supportabil ity is considered
as important a design requirement as cost, schedule and
performance. The program charter for a major weapon system
includes the designation of a logistics manager to assist
the program manager (PM) in developing an ILS Plan (ILSP).
[Ref. 3:pp. 4-64, 4-65] Once a Mission Area Analysis
determines a need exists for a weapon system to fulfill a
defense requirement, it is the responsibility of the
logistics manager, also called the Assistant or Deputy
Program Manager for Logistics (APML) or (DPML), to assist
the Program Management Office (PMO) in investigating the
availability of an existing system to satisfy the
requirements. If no existing system can be found or
modified to meet the need requirements, the APML/DPML, along
with others in the PMO, shall recommend to the PM that a new
weapon system be designed and developed to fulfill the
mission requirement. Early ILS planning is incorporated
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into the initial design and development phases, allowing
weapon system designers to influence the supportabil ity of
their system at a relatively low cost. Even minor changes
during the design phase of a major weapon system can "have a
tremendous impact in out-year logistics support costs."
[Ref. l:pp- 332-333] Supportabil ity is such a major factor
in the design of a new weapon system, that support should be
included in the design specifications.
Design details with significant support impact can extend
the life of the equipment, reduce maintenance time and
cost, increase system availability, and reduce supply
cost over the system's life cycle. [Ref. 3:p. 4-65]
2 . ILS Responsibilities and Key Players
Within the major weapon systems acquisition cycle,
the key players for ILS are the PM and the logistics manager
(APML/DMPL). The PM has overall responsibility for the
success of his/her program, but the logistics manager
coordinates the program's ILS functions for the PM. "One of
the major duties of the logistics manager, in conjunction
with the PM, is to develop and update an ILS Plan (ILSP)."
[Ref. 3:p. 4-65] The ILSP provides a guideline for managing
the activities and resources which will eventually produce
an effective, cost-efficient logistics support system for
the weapon system being developed. The ILSP ensures proper
support planning, reduces duplication of effort and
increases compatibility of resources.
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3 . ILS Elements
ILS provides a technique for designing
supportability requirements into a weapon system
concurrently with the system design. This procedure allows
for trade-offs among ILS elements to be made early in the
acquisition process before the system design is "locked" in.
[Ref. 3:p. 4-65]
The major ILS elements are listed and defined below:
a. Maintenance Planning—The process of establishing
maintenance concepts and requirements for the life-
time of the major weapon system.
b. Manpower and Personnel—The process of identifying
and recruiting military and civilian personnel with
the proper skills and grades to manage, operate and
support a major weapon system.
c. Supply Support—The process of provisioning initial




All the equipment required to
support the operation and maintenance of a major
weapon system.
e. Technical Data—Scientific or technical recorded
information pertaining to the major weapon system.
f. Training and Training Support--The process of
training civilian and military personnel to operate
and maintain the weapon system. Also included are
the training procedures and training devices.
g. Computer Resources Support—The hardware, software,
personnel, documentation and facilities to support
computer systems imbedded in the weapon system.
h. Facilities—The real property, facilities and
related equipment necessary to support a major
weapon system. Also included are the studies con-
ducted to determine these requirements.
98
i. Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation
—
The process o£ ensuring all system, equipment and
spare parts are preserved, packaged, handled,
transported and stored properly.
j. Design Inter face--The relationship of such logis-
tics-related parameters, as reliability and
maintainability, to readiness and supportabil ity
requirements. [Ref. 2:pp. 2-1, 2-2]
The ILS elements are planned concurrently with the
design and development phases of the program, and are merged
into the ILSP by a system called logistics support analysis
(LSA) . LSA includes:
. . . the use of appropriate analytical tools and models
throughout the acquisition cycle to evaluate alternative
support concepts, to perform trade-offs between system
design and ILS elements, and to perform trade-offs among
ILS elements in order to meet system readiness objectives
at minimum cost. [Ref. 3:p. 4-65]
4
. ILS Activities in Major Weapon Systems Acquisition
ILS activity begins at program initiation and
continues throughout the entire life cycle of the weapon
system. Adequate management attention to ILS, during the
early phases of the acquisition process, is essential for
ILS to make its greatest contribution to the successful
deployment of the weapon system. It is during the early
phases, "where the greatest influence can be made on system
design characteristics." [Ref. 4:p. 327]
By Program Initiation, support resource constraints
have been identified in the Justification for Major System
New Start (JMSNS). Based on these resource constraints, the
logistics manager must analyze support costs, develop
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alternative support concepts and integrate readiness-related
requirements into the Statement of Work (SOW) for the new
weapon system design. (Ref. 2:p. 3-1]
By Milestone I, the Demonstration and Validation
Phase (DEM/VAL), the logistics manager must develop a
baseline support concept and integrate it with the system
design creteria. The use of contractor ILS support is
considered at this time. The logistics manager must assist
the PM in drafting milestones for each ILS element and
incorporating them into the ILSP. In addition, the
logistics manager must identify: (1) major items of
support-related hardware and software which need to be
developed, (2) preliminary facilities requirements, (3)
initial system transportability requirements, (4) various
logistics, reliability and maintainability (R&M), including
testability, requirements, (5) projected manpower, skill and
training resources, specifically maintenance and operator
performance, and (6) international logistics considerations.
[Ref. 2:pp. 3-1, 3-2]
By Milestone II, the Full-Scale Development Phase
(FSD), a baseline support concept, including a maintenance
concept, and logistics parameters for readiness, have been
established. Trade-offs among hardware characteristics,
support requirements and resource constraints have been made
to determine the best balance. ILS considerations have been
given appropriate weight and visibility in the request for
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proposal (RFP) source selection criteria and contract
provisions. Contract requirements define peacetime
readiness and wartime deployment objectives, the baseline
operational scenario and the baseline maintenance concept.
Explicit and visible ILS plans and strategies exist for all
ILS elements and requirements. [Ref. 2
: pp . 3-3, 3-4]
By Milestone III, the Production and Deployment
Phase, the ILSP has been determined adequate to meet the
objectives for peacetime readiness and wartime deployment.
In addition, manpower requirements from DoD component
projections can be met, and impacts on the system's
readiness, caused by changes in funding, can readily be
assessed. Computer software has been developed, along with
a system to manage the identification of logistics
requirements to ensure that readiness objectives are met and
sustained. The ILSP provides for a smooth transition from
contractor to in-house support responsibility. In essence,
by Milestone III, all ILS Plans are explicit, and adequate
resources exist to carry out those plans, to achieve system
readiness at an affordable cost over the life of the weapon




The importance of ILS in the successful development
of a major weapon system cannot be overemphasized. "The
achievement of logistic supportabil ity necessitates that all
support requirements be considered, planned, and budgeted
for from the beginning of the development process." [Ref.
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3:p. 4-64] Lieutenant General Leo Marquez, USAF, described
ILS best when he called it "the jawbone that holds the
operational teeth." [Ref. 5:p. 27] ILS supports the weapon
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VI. CONCLUSIONS _AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to synopsize the major
issues currently impacting the field of Government
acquisition. From the ten major issues studied, the
following conclusions and recommendations have been reached.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . The Acquisition Process
a. Conclusion
The acquisition process in the Federal
Government is constantly evolving. New Congressional
legislation is continually being introduced, making changes
to an already over-regulated system. Those engaged in the
Government acquisition process are confronted with a
proliferation of laws, regulations, procedures and legal
precedents. The Federal acquisition process continues to be
an effective mechanism for ensuring that decisions are made
by the proper Government official at the lowest level of
authority possessing a total view of the program, and at the
proper timeframe in the procurement of goods and services
for the Federal Government. Despite all of its cumbersome
properties, the Federal acquisition process is an effective
management system of checks and balances, providing a
mechanism to oversee the spending of public funds.
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b. Recommendation
Leaders in Government acquisition need to become
more proactive in areas of contracting legislation. Rather
than waiting until legislation has been drafted and submitted
to Congress, Government acquisition leaders need to propose
legislative alternatives to Congressional staffs. This
practice would give the acquisition community a voice in





The Packard Commission Report has made a
dramatic impact on the field of Government acquisition.
President Reagan directed Defense Secretary Weinberger to
implement virtually all of the Packard Commission
recommendations. Many of the changes recommended by the
Packard Commission have already been implemented. The most
dramatic change was the establishment of a new Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)). In the
opinion of the researcher, this change has the potential for
the greatest impact on the future of the field of Federal
acquisition. With Mr. Godwin as the new USD(A), the largest
acquisition enterprise in the world finally has a full time
executive, dedicated solely to acquisition.
b. Recommendation
The recommendations of the Packard Commission
should be fully analyzed and implemented. The establishment
of the USD(A) is a major step in the right direction. The
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defense acquisition community was in need of strong cohesive
leadership. Positive steps need to be taken to
professionalize and upgrade the status of the acquisition
work force to attract and retain qualified professionals.
3 . Competition in Acquisition
a. Conclusion
Competition in acquisition has received much
greater emphasis than ever before. Much progress has been
made to increase the number of competitive actions in
Government procurements. Programs such as the Navy's Buy
Our Spares Smart (BOSS), have used innovative techniques
such as break-out to effectively increase competition.
Break-out involves buying spare parts for a major weapon
system from a source other than the prime contractor, which
is usually the original manufacturer of the weapon system.
Using the break-out approach, the Navy has saved millions of
dollars by acquiring spare parts directly from the parts
manufacturer or by competing the break-out item.
b. Recommendation
Sustained high level attention is needed to keep
competition in the forefront of acquisition strategies. The
Competition Advocate Program is experiencing considerable
success in promoting competition wherever it is possible and
practicable. Care must be taken to avoid competition just
for competition's sake. Competition must be done whenever
it makes sense and saves the Government money. Breaking-out
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should be done whenever possible to cut out the expense of
companies which provide little to no value added. Break-out
is definitely an area where increased savings from
competition can be realized.
4
. Weapon Systems Warranties
a. Conclusion
Weapon systems warranties do not come without
cost to the Government. By shifting the risk, of performance
from the Government to the weapon systems contractor, the
seller becomes liable for proper quality and performance of
the weapon system. The contractor charges the Government
for this warranty, whereas in the past, the Government was
self-insured. In order for the Government to truly benefit
from paying for and having a weapon system warranty,
Government personnel must diligently manage these
warranties. Management of weapon systems warranties is
difficult because so many different manufacturers make parts
and components for one weapon system. Keeping track of
which contractors are responsible for guaranteeing various
components is a huge task. When parts are broken-out and
purchased from sources other than the prime contractor, the
task gets even more complicated. In order for the
Government to realize benefits from warranties, an effective
warranty management system must be developed.
b. Recommendation
The Government should develop an effective
warranties management system in order to realize the
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benefits intended. The Government has shifted the risk of
performance to the contractor, but the Government must know
which contractor provided the warranty in order to enforce
it. A sophisticated system of tracking warranties needs to
be developed.
5 . Source Selection
a. Conclusion
Source selection is an integral part of the
acquisition process. In competitively negotiated
procurements, the principal objectives of the source
selection process, are to maximize competition, minimize the
complexity of the selection decision and ensure an impartial
evaluation of proposals to select the best offeror. The
source selection plan, which is part of the overall
acquisition strategy, includes the evaluation criteria to be
used in selecting a contractor. Evaluation criteria are
developed from the statement of work, and serve to inform
the offerors of the importance placed by the Government, on
different aspects of the proposal. Once proposals are
received by the Government, the source selection official,
or the Source Selection Evaluation Board in major weapon
systems acquisitions, evaluates each proposal. The final
steps include the source selection decision and notification
of award. Source selection will always be a major step in
the award of Government contracts.
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b. Recommendation
Source selection procedures should be tailored
to fit each specific acquisition to minimize overall cost to
the Government and the contractor. Source selection
criteria and their relative importance should come directly
from and accurately reflect the intent of the statement of
work, with price or cost to the Government, always one of
the evaluation criterion. Government contracting officers
should ensure that source selection procedures are carefully
structured and strictly followed to avoid any appearance of





Delays in contractor performance cost the
Government time as well as taxpayers' dollars every year.
Military readiness as well as Governmental efficiency
suffers. Program schedules slip and costs generally
increase. Some delays are for good reasons and are
excusable. Some are caused by Governmental actions in
delivering Government furnished equipment or materials.
Others are caused by a combination of actions, or inactions,
by both the Government and the contractor.
b. Recommendation
More attention by the contracting officer and
the contractor should be placed on preventing or reducing
delays. Regardless of where the blame lies, delays need to
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be addressed promptly so the contractor can complete the
contract and the Government can obtain its material or
services in a timely manner. In addition, each situation
must be dealt with carefully to avoid further delays or
misunderstandings
.
7 . The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA)
a. Conclusion
The ASBCA is an efficient and a relatively
expeditious administrative means of settling contract
disputes that cannot be resolved at the contracting officer
level. If all Governmental contract disputes had to be
taken through the regular courts system, cases, and as a
result Government contracts, would be tied up in litigation
for years. The "accelerated method" for resolving disputes,
permits a contractor to submit claims of $50,000 or less
before the ASBCA who then must decide the case within 180
days. Under this method the contractor is still allowed to
appeal an unfavorable decision to the U.S. Claims Court.
b. Recommendation
Contracting officers and contractors should do
everything in their power to settle differences and
misunderstandings informally to avoid the disputes process.
Disputes are lengthy and costly to both the contractor and
the Government. Contracting officers should work, to resolve
all disagreements with contractors by informal discussions,
saving time and money and strengthening business
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relationships. When disagreements do enter the disputes
process, the contracting officer should issue his/her final
decision within the specified time periods required by law,
after receiving a written request from the contractor, or
within a reasonable time period, if no request is received.
When final decisions are issued in an expeditious manner,
the facts are fresh and a higher quality decision will
generally result.
8
. Weighted Guidelines for Profit
a. Conclusion
The Weighted Guidelines (WGLs) method of
establishing profit objectives for negotiated Government
contracts, promises an amount of profit based on the skills
and resources needed to perform the contract, the amount of
cost risk involved in the contract and the extent of
facilities required to perform the contract. The new WGLs
differ dramatically from the method used previously. To
incentivize contractors to invest in equipment to be used on
Government contracts, the new profit policy increases profit
for facilities capital employed. This shift in emphasis
from a cost-based profit policy to one based on capital
facilities, is expected to reduce the profit levels for
contractors without capital facilities. In addition, the
disallowance of G&A in the profit base, will cause
contractors to appropriately direct charge more costs, and





Experience with the new WGLs should be acquired
before any significant adjustments are made. It is
encumbent upon contracting officers and contractors to
become thoroughly familiar with the new profit policy in
order to achieve its principal objectives.
9 . The Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
Study
a. Conclusion
The DFAIR study made many important observations
and recommendations regarding contract pricing, financing
and profit policies. The most sweeping change which
resulted from DFAIR is the new Weighted Guidelines (WGLs)
method of profit analysis which became effective 18 October
1986. The new WGLs are designed to result in more
Government contractors investing in production equipment for
work on Government contracts. A reduction in profit levels
for contractors without capital facilities is expected.
b. Recommendation
DoD should implement the DFAIR recommendations
for a trial period, to evaluate their effectiveness in
achieving desired results such as: (1) reducing excess
profits and (2) incent ivizing contractors to invest in
facilities capital for use on Government contracts. After
the trial period, if some of the DFAIR recommended changes
are not producing the desired results, DoD should reevaluate
them and make the necessary adjustments.
Ill
10 . Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
a. Conclusion
The requirement to manage ILS has become
increasingly important to program managers of major weapon
systems. To be able to perform their mission effectively,
operational commanders must have adequate logistics support.
ILS provides a technique for designing supportabil ity
requirements into a weapon system concurrently with the
system design. This procedure allows for trade-offs among
ILS elements to be made early in the acquisition process
before the system design is "locked" in. ILS planning
begins at program initiation and continues for the life of
the system. System readiness is essential to the weapon




ILS planning must be incorporated early in the
acquisition of major weapon systems. ILS planning must
begin at program initiation and continue throughout the life
cycle of the system. Adequate management attention must be
focused on ILS during the early phases of the acquisition
process, when ILS can have the greatest influence on system
design characteristics. Before Milestone I, the logistics
manager must assist the program manager in preparing the ILS
Plan (ILSP) which includes milestone dates for the
implementation of each ILS element. The ILSP must be
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continually updated as the logistics manager tracks the
progress of ILS functions throughout the major weapon system
acquisition process. Early ILS planning must be supported
by the program manager to ensure adequate logistics support
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